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BINDING THE ENFORCERS: THE ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW STRUGGLE BEHIND PRESIDENT OBAMA'S
IMMIGRATION ACTIONS
Michael Kagan *
INTRODUCTION
President Obama has made executive action and prosecutorial
discretion his signature contributions to immigration policy. His
aim has been to focus enforcement against immigrants caught at
the border or with criminal records while easing the path toward
integration for others.' These actions-a collection of policies that
use discretion to improve the legal standing of millions of unau-
thorized immigrants or at least shield them from arrest and de-
portation-may benefit as many as 87% of the unauthorized im-
migrants in the United States.! The most important of these
* Associate Professor at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, William S. Boyd School
of Law. B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Michigan Law School. This ar-
ticle benefited from insights and feedback from Jill E. Family, Hiroshi Motomura, and Da-
vid Rubenstein. All errors are mine.
1. See generally Michael Kagan, A Taxonomy of Discretion: Refining the Legality De-
bate About Obama's Executive Actions on Immigration, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1083 (2015)
(describing President Obama's immigration policy reforms); Jerry Markon, Obama Admin-
istration Scales Back Deportations in Policy Shift, WASH. POST (July 2, 2015), https:
//www.washingtonpost.com/politics/dhs-scales-back-deportations-aims-to-integrate-illegal-
immigrants-into-society/2015/07/02/890960d2-1b56-1 1e5-93b7-5eddcO56ad8astory.htm1
(discussing President Obama's immigration policy shift toward integration).
2. Julia Preston, Most Undocumented Immigrants Will Stay Under Obama's New
Policies, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/us/
politics/most-undocumented-immigrants-will-stay-under-obamas-new-policies-report-says.
html. The Obama Administration has made it clear that those people granted deferred
action will also receive employment authorization, which, in addition to allowing a person
to be legally employed, facilitates obtaining Social Security numbers and other benefits.
See Frequently Asked Questions: DACA and Your Workplace Rights, NAT'L IMMIGRATION L.
CTR. (July 15, 2015), https://nilc.org/dacaworkplacerights.html. Beyond deferred action,
President Obama's Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") has announced the criteria
it uses to decide whether to prioritize non-citizens for deportation (or non-deportation),
which has the potential to allow many unlawfully present immigrants to know in advance
whether they are likely to be pursued by Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"),
even if they are not formally granted deferred action. See Markon, supra note 1.
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programs are known popularly by their acronyms-DACA (De-
ferred Action for Childhood Arrivals) and DAPA (Deferred Action
for Parental Accountability). These policies have been explained
by the President as part of a struggle between himself and con-
gressional Republicans.' President Obama has been frustrated in
his push for comprehensive immigration reform through legisla-
tion and thus has used unilateral executive action as an alterna-
tive to achieve his policy goals.
This article makes the case that President Obama's immigra-
tion actions should also be understood as the result of a struggle
within the Executive Branch. As such, the ultimate resolution of
the DACA/DAPA controversy may determine how much power
Presidents in the future will have to control the frontline opera-
tion of the Executive Branch that they nominally head, especially
in situations where the employees of key agencies personally op-
pose the President's policy orientation. The current internal Ex-
3. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on
Immigration (Nov. 20, 2014) [hereinafter Remarks by the President], https://www.whi
tehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/20/remarks-president-address-nation-im migration ("I
worked with Congress on a comprehensive fix, and last year, 68 Democrats, Republicans,
and independents came together to pass a bipartisan bill in the Senate.... But for a year
and a half now, Republican leaders in the House have refused to allow that simple
vote.. . . I continue to believe that the best way to solve this problem is by working to-
gether to pass that kind of common sense law. But until that happens, there are actions I
have the legal authority to take as President .. . that will help make our immigration sys-
tem more fair and more just.").
4. In recent articles, Professors Hiroshi Motomura, Adam B. Cox, and Cristina M.
Rodriguez have also observed that tension within the executive branch was a critical con-
text for the evolution of President Obama's immigration enforcement policies. See Adam B.
Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux, 125 YALE L.J.
104, 187-94 (2015) [hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law Redux];
Hiroshi Motomura, The President's Dilemma: Executive Authority, Enforcement, and the
Rule of Law in Immigration Law, 55 WASHBURN L.J. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1-2)
(on file with author). This has also been noted in passing or in brief discussions by other
commentators. See, e.g., Ahilan Arulanantham, The President's Relief Program as a Re-
sponse to Insurrection, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25, 2014, 5:00 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com
/2014/11/the-presidents-relief-program-as.html; Anil Kalhan, Is Judge Hanen's Smack-
down of Executive Action on Immigration "Narrowly Crafted'? DORF ON L. (Feb. 21, 2015),
http://balkin.blogspot.comi/2014/11/the-presidents-relief-program-as.html ("[E]nforcement
patterns in the field often diverged significantly from the enforcement priorities and
guidelines for the exercise of discretion set from above, in part due to Congress's dramatic
expansion in the categories of individuals who are potentially deportable, in part due to
the massive growth in the scale of enforcement that has occurred as a result, and in part
due to resistance to those priorities by officials in the field, in the form of what immi-
grants' rights lawyer Ahilan Arulanantham goes so far as to characterize as an
'insurrection."').
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ecutive Branch struggle over immigration policy has placed, on
one side, the President and his appointed agency heads, who have
sought to use prosecutorial discretion to shield many unauthor-
ized immigrants from deportation and to target immigration en-
forcement efforts against "[flelons, not families."' On the other
side of this struggle are frontline immigration enforcement offic-
ers and their union representatives who do not agree with the
President's agenda. This struggle is the essential context neces-
sary to comprehend what is really at stake in some of the tech-
nical administrative law arguments that have become decisive in
the litigation regarding President Obama's policies. However, this
is a difficult story for the Administration itself to tell because it
depicts a President having difficulty controlling agencies that os-
tensibly answer to him, which the public may interpret as a sign
of weakness.
President Obama's use of executive action to change immigra-
tion policy has been extremely controversial and has been subject
to multiple court challenges. In February 2015, just days before
applications were to begin for DAPA and an expanded version of
DACA that the President announced in November 2014, a coali-
tion of twenty-six states led by Texas succeeded in obtaining a
preliminary injunction against implementation of the programs.
This litigation continues at the time of writing.'
Already an interesting evolution has developed in the argu-
ments about the policies' legality. Initially, objections by Republi-
can politicianso and conservative legal scholars" focused on a
5. Remarks by the President, supra note 3.
6. See generally Motomura, supra note 4 (manuscript at 1) (arguing that President
Obama's immigration actions are justified by a practical and historical context in which
"he is in command of a highly discretionary enforcement system, and his subordinates in
the field resist the enforcement priorities that he has adopted to guide the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion").
7. Cf. Arulanantham, supra note 4 ("For obvious reasons, the Administration has not
discussed the failure of the Morton memos in any of its recent public statements-they tell
a story of an agency at war with its political leadership.").
8. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604, 677-78 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
9. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2015) (denying an emergency
appeal of the district court's preliminary injunction); Texas v. United States, 2015 WL
6873190 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming the preliminary injunction); Michael D. Shear & Julie
Preston, In Courts, Running out the Clock on Obama Immigration Plan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
13, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/14/us/in-courts-running-out-the-clock-on-obam
a-immigration-plan.html.
10. See, e.g., Eric Bradner & Jedd Rosche, Republicans Hammer Legal Case Against
2016] 667
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separation of powers argument. The basic claims were that the
President was unilaterally usurping Congress's authority to make
laws and defying the Constitution's requirement that the Presi-
dent "shall take [c]are that the [1]aws be faithfully executed."1 2
Justice Scalia, in a loud dissent in Arizona v. United States,
claimed that the Administration was "exempting from immigra-
tion enforcement" millions of unlawful immigrants and that Pres-
ident Obama "declines to enforce" immigration statutes.'" This
line of argument has slipped into the background, at least in
court, because the Supreme Court (Justice Scalia notwithstand-
ing) has repeatedly affirmed the legitimacy of prosecutorial dis-
cretion in immigration enforcement."
Instead of focusing on the constitutional arguments rooted in
the Take Care Clause, the district court in the Texas litigation
justified its preliminary injunction on a more technical argument
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), namely that the
DAPA and DACA'5 programs are invalid because they are a form
of rulemaking that did not go through a notice-and-comment pro-
cess. This later became known as the APA procedural ground."
On its face, this is a considerably more modest claim. It effective-
ly assumes that the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS")
can initiate the deferred action programs by which the govern-
ment decides to temporarily decline to pursue deportation of cer-
tain non-citizens who are unlawfully present according to the
Immigration and Nationality Act, but that it just did not follow
Obama on Immigration, CNN (Nov. 21, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/20/
politics/republican-response-obama-immigration-speech/; Erin Kelly, Congress Responds to
Obama with Bitter Partisan Split, USA TODAY (Nov. 20, 2014, 5:59 PM), http://www.usato
day.com/story/news/politics/2014/11/20/immigration-executive-action-congressional-react
ion-boehner/70031622/.
11. See, e.g., Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administra-
tion's Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause,
91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 784 (2013).
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
13. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2521 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
14. See discussion infra at Part I.A.
15. The Texas case only challenges DAPA and the expanded version of DACA an-
nounced in November 2014, not the original version of DACA announced in 2012. Texas v.
United States, Civ. No. B-14-254, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45483, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 7,
2015). I explain the differences in these programs in Part I.B. While the states chose not to
challenge the original DACA program, their administrative law objections appear to apply
to that program as well.
16. See discussion infra Part III. C.
17. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *2 (5th Cir. 2015).
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the steps required by administrative law." This argument implic-
itly concedes that executive discretion is part of immigration law
and does not focus on separation of powers between the President
and Congress. But the notice-and-comment objection raises a dif-
ferent question, namely who within the Executive Branch should
exercise this discretion as a default matter. Should the President
and his cabinet decide against whom to enforce immigration law,
or should frontline officers?
In November 2015, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the preliminary injunction, noting that there were three
alternative substantive challenges to DAPA and DACA: the APA
procedural argument, a claim that the programs violated the APA
substantively, and the argument that the President had violated
the Constitution's Take Care Clause." The court of appeals af-
firmed on the APA procedural ground,20 as well as on the APA
substantive ground.21 This article will not address the APA sub-
22
stantive argument.
The claim that DACA and DAPA required a notice-and-
comment process draws support from a muddled body of case law
emanating from the D.C. Circuit, which the Fifth Circuit has
largely adopted.23 In these cases, most explicitly in Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA,24 the D.C. Circuit indicated that a notice-and-
comment process may be required whenever an agency headquar-
ters issues a policy that directs field agents how to exercise dis-
cretion." However, this interpretation appears to have been dicta
in D.C. Circuit case law and is by no means the only way to inter-
pret the APA. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit has been inconsistent
about whether it really meant to set down as strict a rule as it
18. The decision by the District Court in Texas has been faulted for myriad distortions
of immigration law and other factual matters that were important to the legal analysis.
See Anil Kalhan, Deferred Action, Supervised Enforcement Discretion and the Rule of Law
Basis for Executive Action on Immigration, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 58, 64 (2015) [hereinaf-
ter Kalhan, Deferred Action].
19. Texas, 2015 WL 6873190, at *2.
20. Id. at *18-22.
21. Id. at *22-25.
22. Cf. id. at 47 (King, J., dissenting) (disputing whether it was proper for the court of
appeals to consider the APA substantive claim since it was not a basis for the district
court's injunction and thus was not fully addressed in the appellate arguments).
23. See discussion infra Part III.B.
24. 249 F.3d 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
25. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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seemed to articulate in Appalachian Power. The Texas litigation
against President Obama's immigration policies are thus pursu-
ing an expansion of a questionable legal doctrine that strengthens
the power of public employees and weakens the authority of the
President over the Executive Branch he ostensibly heads. Thus,
there is a critical question about whether the APA should be in-
terpreted in this manner.
The administrative law challenge to DACA and DAPA contests
innovations that President Obama has made in how Presidents
use their discretionary power to enforce immigration law.26 Previ-
ous administrations used deferred action.2 7 While President
Obama did not invent prosecutorial discretion in immigration en-
forcement, he has made such policies uniquely prominent and
transparent, announcing them with considerable political fanfare
and making them central to his legacy in domestic policy. While
previous administrations kept their deferred action policies close-
ly guarded, the Obama Administration announced clear-cut crite-
ria under which millions of unauthorized immigrants may apply
for deferred action. The Administration established an applica-
tion procedure that appears much like the application system the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") uses for
statutory visa categories. It is precisely because the Obama poli-
cies are so clear and transparent that questions have been raised
about whether they should have been subject to a notice-and-
comment process.
The shifts that have occurred in the DACA and DAPA litiga-
tion are a reminder that immigration law is a creature of admin-
istrative law." Accordingly, broader theories of administrative
law should be invoked to consider how immigration enforcement
policy should be made in the Executive Branch. In particular,
there are compelling reasons why presidential control over agen-
cies-a prominent but contentious idea in administrative law
scholarship-is especially important in the immigration arena.
26. See Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 613-14 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
27. See generally Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in
Immigration Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 243 (2010) [hereinafter Wadhia, Role of Discre-
tion] (describing the evolutionary history and use of deferred action).
28. See generally Jill E. Family, Administrative Law Through the Lens of Immigration
Law, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 565 (2012) (discussing immigration law as a type of administra-
tive law).
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This article argues that President Obama's immigration policies
represent a strategy by which the elected Chief Executive and the
head of an agency seek to thwart resistance from their policies by
subordinate public employees. Criteria for the use of discretion
have been dictated with such clarity that the frontline officers
have no real discretion remaining and thus less ability to make
decisions contrary to the President's preferences. Discretionary
authority has thus effectively been moved from low-level public
employees to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Presi-
dent. In this light, President Obama's policies are a pro-
management measure that legitimizes longstanding critiques of
the power of public employees over public policy, a line of argu-
ment normally associated with conservative politicians and
scholars. These efforts to strengthen the President's control over
frontline enforcement have been stymied by litigation filed by
Texas and twenty-five other states-ironically, primarily politi-
cally conservative governors and state attorney generals-
arguing that the President is illegally taking discretion away
from anonymous public employees who never have to stand for
election and who are essentially not accountable to voters.
The Obama immigration actions depend on the premise that
the President should be able to control executive agencies. To
make this case, liberal backers of immigration reform can borrow
heavily from conservative critiques of public sector employees. At
the same time, it is important for conservative jurists to question
whether weakening the power of the elected executive vis-A-vis
public employees serves the purposes of administrative law. The
managerial strategies that the Obama Administration developed
in immigration may be used by future Presidents for a variety of
policy goals, both liberal and conservative. Thus this may be a
useful opportunity to develop a common understanding about
how Presidents can use executive discretion and how they may
direct frontline field agents to pursue their policy goals.
To address these urgent questions, this article proceeds as fol-
lows. Part I summarizes how executive discretion has evolved in
immigration law and how the Obama Administration changed its
approach to discretion from 2009 through 2014. Then, Part II il-
lustrates the resistance that President Obama faced from front-
line enforcement agents within the DHS and how this resistance
supported the litigation by Texas and other states against DACA
6712016]
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and DAPA. Part III examines the ambiguities within administra-
tive law that made this litigation possible and effectively
strengthened the power of subordinate employees of the DHS vis-
A-vis the head of the Department and the President. In Part IV,
this article draws two analogies to illustrate the problems for
constitutional democracy that result from giving public employees
the ability to undermine the policy preferences of elected leaders.
One of these analogies concerns public sector unions, which, con-
servative scholars note have the potential to thwart voters' ability
to influence policy through the democratic process. The second
analogy comes from First Amendment law, where courts have
seen the need to distinguish public employees' freedom to dissent
as private citizens from their obligations to fulfill their official du-
ties at work.
I. IMMIGRATION DISCRETION IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION
A. Discretion in Immigration Law Generally
While President Obama's initial priority was to enact legisla-
tive immigration reform, his election triggered interest in what
the President might be able to do to change immigration policy
without congressional action. Writing around the time of the 2008
election, Professors Adam Cox and Cristina Rodriguez argued
that the President had broad discretion to shape how immigra-
tion law is enforced. 29 For them, the dysfunctional nature of im-
migration law gave the President a far more important role in de-
cision making.o While Congress has tightly regulated who could
legally enter the country, it has also designated far more people
theoretically deportable than could actually be deported."' As a
29. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law,
119 YALE L.J. 458, 462-64 (2009) [hereinafter Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigra-
tion Law]. But see Mariano-Florentino Cubllar, The Political Economies of Immigration
Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 84 (2012) (acknowledging that his perspective contrasted
with Cox and Rodriguez's view because in his view, the President's actual power was con-
strained by internal resistance within the government).
30. Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law, supra note 29, at 461, 463.
31. Id. at 463-64; Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm'r, Immigration and Nat-
uralization Serv., to Reg'l Dirs., Dist. Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, Reg'1 and Dist. Counsel 4
(Nov. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Memorandum from Doris Meissner], http://www.legalaction
center.org/sites/default/files/docs/laclMeissner-2000-memo.pdf (noting the government
does not have the resources to investigate and prosecute all immigration violations).
[Vol. 50:665672
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result, Cox and Rodriguez argued that the President has the
"power to decide which and how many noncitizens should live in
the United States . . . through the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion with respect to whom to deport . . . ."3 They argued that "the
inauguration of a new President can bring with it remarkable
changes in immigration policy." 33
Prosecutorial discretion is a widely accepted doctrine that holds
that police, prosecutors, and regulators are under no obligation to
strictly and aggressively enforce the letter of the law in every
case. In administrative law, the leading case on prosecutorial
discretion is Heckler v. Chaney, where the Supreme Court found
that a decision by an agency not to enforce a particular law is
"presumptively unreviewable."" According to a footnote in Heck-
ler, prosecutorial discretion has some undefined limit if non-
enforcement were to become "so extreme as to amount to an abdi-
cation of [an agency's] statutory responsibilities."" However, the
Supreme Court has yet to clarify when the Heckler footnote might
apply.
In the immigration context, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
endorsed the general authority of the Executive Branch to decide
not to enforce the law in every case. In Reno v. American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Comm., the Court found that the Executive
may decide whether to initiate or continue deportation proceed-
ings "for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own conven-
ience."3 In 2012, in Arizona v. United States, the Court reiterated
that "broad discretion" is a "principal feature" of the immigration
system." This discretion was a central part of the Court's reason-
ing that Arizona Senate Bill 1070 interfered with federal immi-
gration law, even though the letter of the Arizona statute mir-
32. Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law, supra note 29, at 464.
33. Id.
34. See Maria Fufidio, "You May Say I'm a Dreamer, but I'm Not the Only One"' Cate-
gorical Prosecutorial Discretion and Its Consequences for US Immigration Law, 36
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 976, 979 (2013). See also Wadhia, Role of Discretion, supra note 27, at
244 (characterizing prosecutorial discretion as a "welcome and necessary component of
immigration law"); Memorandum from Doris Meissner, supra note 31, at 3 (describing
support for the prosecutorial discretion doctrine from the courts and legislature).
35. 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).
36. Id. at 833 n.4.
37. 525 U.S 471, 484 (1999).
38. 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
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rored the federal immigration statute." Despite the statutory
similarity, the Court found that independent state enforcement
efforts would obstruct the federal authority to decide how to en-
force the law.40
Discretion not to enforce the law in every case is a classic form
of prosecutorial discretion, which is exercised routinely by law en-
forcement officers, police agencies, and prosecutors at all levels of
government." Non-enforcement is the absence of an action; it in-
volves the government simply deciding not to enforce the law
* 42
against a certain person. In a strict sense, simple non-
enforcement does not even require the knowledge of the benefi-
ciary. 43 As background, previous research by Professor Shoba Si-
vaprasad Wadhia documented that prosecutorial discretion in the
field of immigration dates back at least to the Nixon administra-
tion.44 But previous administrations went to considerable lengths
to shield such policies from public view." Public knowledge of
such policies in immigration enforcement stemmed initially from
Freedom of Information Act litigation relating to the federal gov-
ernment's attempts to deport John Lennon in the 1970s."
A common rationale for prosecutorial discretion is that en-
forcement resources are limited, and so the Executive must set
priorities regarding how to enforce the law." But the Court has
been clear that other concerns may also justify discretion, even if
enforcement resources are available. Expanding on the reference
to "humanitarian reasons" in American-Arab, the Arizona Court
said this:
39. Id. at 2502. ("Arizona contends that § 3 [of S.B. 1070] can survive preemption be-
cause the provision has the same aim as federal law and adopts its substantive stand-
ards.").
40. Id. at 2502-03.
41. See Fufidio, supra note 34, at 979.
42. See Wadhia, Role of Discretion, supra note 27, at 246.
43. See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, The Need for Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMPLE POL.
& Civ. RTS. L. REV. 369, 369 (2010).
44. See Wadhia, Role of Discretion, supra note 27, at 246-48.
45. See, e.g., Memorandum from Dr. Emilio T. Gonzalez, Dir., USCIS, to Prakash
Khatri, USCIS Ombudsman (Aug. 7, 2007), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOm
budsman RR_32 _0DeferredAction_04-06-07.pdf (suggesting that information about de-
ferred action not be posted on the USCIS website).
46. See Wadhia, Role of Discretion, supra note 27, at 246-52.
47. See Kagan, supra note 1, at 1084-85.
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Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces immedi-
ate human concerns. Unauthorized workers trying to support their
families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien smugglers or
aliens who commit a serious crime. The equities of an individual case
may turn on many factors, including whether the alien has children
born in the United States, lon ties to the community, or a record of
distinguished military service.
In Arizona, the Court discussed discretion in order to explain why
the federal government could preempt states in setting immigra-
tion enforcement strategy, not only in establishing the criteria for
legal immigration.49 Because this discretion is exercised by the
Executive, immigration represents a situation where, in addition
to Congress's ability to preempt states through legislation, the
President can preempt states through prosecutorial discretion.o
At some level, assessment of humanitarian factors requires a
value judgment. Deportation is always a harsh measure, so it is
an open question when "immediate human concerns" are weighty
enough to mitigate against it. Although it is clearly established
that this discretion belongs to the federal government (and not to
the states), the critical question is who within the federal gov-
ernment should be empowered to make this decision. This article
shall return to this below in Parts III and the conclusion. For
now, it is enough to note that prosecutorial discretion can be ex-
ercised in many different ways and that there may not be an ob-
jectively correct way to do so. In a democracy, it is normally con-
sidered desirable for such policy choices to be made through a
political process that is ultimately accountable to voters.
B. Immigration Discretion in the Obama Administration
President Obama came into office promising to promote com-
prehensive legislative reform of America's immigration laws."
But these efforts stalled in his first term. In 2010, the DREAM
Act, which would have provided a legal status for unauthorized
48. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
49. Id. at 2501, 2506.
50. See Catherine Y. Kim, Immigration Separation of Power and the President's Power
to Preempt, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 732 (2014).
51. See Josh Hicks, Obama's Failed Promise of a First-Year Immigration Overhaul,
WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/oba
mas-failed-promise-of-a-first-year-immigration-overhaul/2012/09/25/06997958-0721-1 1e2-
al0c-fa5a255a9258_b1og.html.
2016] 675
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immigrants who came to the United States as children, passed
the House of Representatives, but only fifty-five senators voted to
end a filibuster, five short of the sixty required to end debate, ef-
fectively killing the bill.52 The high water mark for legislative
immigration reform during the Obama Administration came in
2013 when the Senate passed S.744 by a 68-32 vote. But the bill
was never brought up for a vote in the House, and the issue re-
mains a high profile political stalemate as the 2016 election cam-
paign begins to take shape.5 ' Assuming that Congress does not
take action during the presidential campaign, two full decades
will have passed since the enactment of the last major immigra-
tion reform law, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act ("IIRIRA"), which was signed by President Bill
Clinton during his re-election campaign in 1996.'"
President Obama's first major executive innovation in the field
of immigration discretion was transparency. In 2007, the Bush
Administration rebuffed a recommendation by the USCIS Om-
budsman to make deferred action policies public.5 ' But in 2011
the Obama Administration made public two memoranda about
prosecutorial discretion from John Morton, the then-Director of
Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE").5 ' The Morton
52. See Naftali Bendavid, Dream Act Fails in Senate, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 19, 2010, 9:36
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704368004576027570843930428.
53. S. 744, 113th Cong., 159 CONG. REC. 5330 (2013).
54. See Philip E. Wolgin, 2 Years Later, Immigrants Are Still Waiting on Immigration
Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 24, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/iss
ues/immigration/news/2015/06/24/115835/2-years-later-immigrants-are-still-waiting-on-im
migration-reform/.
55. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 18
U.S.C.). Although IIRIRA is often described as the last broad legislative change to immi-
gration law, more recent changes to immigration law have focused on more narrow prob-
lems. For example, in 2000, Congress established new visa categories for crime victims
and trafficking victims, known as the U Visa and T Visa, respectively. Battered Immigrant
Women Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114 Stat. 1518, § 1502(a) (included in
the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 114
Stat. 1464) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).
56. Wadhia, Role of Discretion, supra note 27, at 262-63.
57. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enf't, to
Agency Pers., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Aliens (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdflprosecutorial-
discretion-memo.pdf- Memorandum from John Morton, Dir. of U.S. Immigration and Cus-
toms Enft, to Agency Pers., Prosecutorial Discretion: Certain Victims, Witnesses, and
Plaintiffs (June 17, 2011), https://www.ice.gov/doclib/foialprosecutorial-discretion/certain-
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Memos, as they became known, may have been notable more for
their publication than for their actual content. The Morton Mem-
os noted that the Administration built on previous internal poli-
cies dating mainly from the late Clinton Administration and the
George W. Bush Administration, as well as one policy from 1976.
They further stated that prosecutorial discretion should be "regu-
larly exercise[d]" by ICE officers and attorneys and could be exer-
cised "at any stage of an enforcement proceeding."5
In terms of when and how discretion should be exercised, the
Morton Memos left much unclear.o They provided a list of nine-
teen bullet-point factors to consider." The first factor was opaque:
"the agency's civil immigration enforcement priorities."62 Others
were more specific. For example, one factor was "whether the per-
son has a U.S. citizen or permanent resident spouse, child, or
parent."" Another was, "the person's criminal history, including
arrests, prior convictions, or outstanding arrest warrants."" Some
of the bullet points contained multiple sub-factors and considera-
ble legal complexity, such as "whether the person is likely to be
granted temporary or permanent status or other relief from re-
moval, including as an asylum seeker, or a victim of domestic vio-
lence, human trafficking, or other crime." 5 Others were highly
specific: "whether the person or the person's spouse is pregnant or
nursing.""
The Morton Memos noted that "[t]his list is not exhaustive and
no one factor is determinative."" But then on the following page,
victims-witnesses-plaintiffs.pdf.
58. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enft, to
Agency Pers., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Aliens, supra note 57, at 1.
59. Id. at 2, 5.
60. See Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at
185-90 (describing the limitations of the Morton Memos).
61. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs Enft, to
Agency Pers., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil Immigration
Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Aliens, supra note 57, at 4.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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they list eight positive factors and four negative factors that mer-
it "particular care and consideration."" These include, for exam-
ple, "individuals present in the United States since childhood" as
a positive factor and "known gang members" as a negative fac-
tor.69
The trouble with the Morton Memos is that, while each factor
is perhaps relatively uncontroversial when taken in isolation, it is
not clear how much weight should be given to each one or how
they should be weighed against each other in the complexity of a
real case. Should deportation proceedings be initiated against an
unlawfully present person who was brought to the United States
as a child, has a misdemeanor theft conviction, and was a mem-
ber of a gang ten years ago but today is a nursing mother who
cares for her U.S. citizen child and her elderly mother? The Mor-
ton Memos do not provide a clear answer.
Put another way, the Morton Memos required judgment calls, a
feature that is inherent in prosecutorial discretion. Because the
Morton Memos did not prescribe how to make these decisions,
they left much in the hands of frontline ICE officers to decide how
to evaluate individual cases. This reality produced considerable
frustration from immigration activists who complained that sym-
pathetic immigrants were still being placed into removal proceed-
68. Id. at 5. These factors are:
Positive factors:
(a) veterans and members of the U.S. armed forces;
(b) long-time lawful permanent residents;
(c) minors and elderly individuals;
(d) individuals present in the United States since childhood;
(e) pregnant or nursing women;
(f) victims of domestic violence, trafficking, or other serious crimes;
(g) individuals who suffer from a serious mental or physical disability; and
(h) individuals with serious health conditions.
Negative factors:
(a) individuals who pose a clear risk to national security;
(b) serious felons, repeat offenders, or individuals with a lengthy criminal record of any
kind;
(c) known gang members or other individuals who pose a clear danger to public safety;
and
(d) individuals with an egregious record of immigration violations, including those with
a record of illegal re-entry and those who have engaged in immigration fraud.
Id.
69. Id.
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ings.7 An attorney with the American Civil Liberties Union
summarized the problems as follows:
[I1n practice the memos did almost nothing to change enforcement
practices on the ground. I experienced this failure first-hand.... De-
spite Director Morton's explicit guidance to the field, ICE's review of
approximately 300,000 pending cases resulted in less than two per-
cent of them being closed. As a report concluded one year after the
memos' release, "For an initiative that was expected to help poten-
tially millions of individuals who fit the 'low-priority' criteria . . . the
statistics show a resounding failure of the DHS to implement the
policy.,,
7 1
The early frustrations with the implementation of the Morton
Memos are an essential context to explain how President Obama
and the DHS have used executive discretion since 2012.72
The Morton Memos remained in place officially until November
2014.7' They were then replaced by more concrete "enforcement
priorities."" DHS now has three priority groups for immigration
enforcement." Leaving aside national security cases, the en-
70. See, e.g., Bill Ong Hing, The Failure of Prosecutorial Discretion and the Deporta-
tion of Oscar Martinez, 15 SCHOLAR 437, 532 (2013) (describing the failure to apply Mor-
ton Memo criteria in a particular case).
71. Arulanantham, supra note 4 (quoting One Year Later: Report Shows Morton Memo
Hasn't Delivered on Promises of Relief, REFORM IMMIGRATION FOR AM., http://reformim
migrationforamerica.org/30one-year-later-report-shows-morton-memo-hasn-t-delivered-on-
promises-of-relief/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2015)).
72. See also Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at
187-92 (describing the failures of the Morton Memos in changing enforcement practice).
73. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Customs and Immigration Enf't, et al. 2 (Nov. 20,
2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo-prosecutorial-di
scretion.pdf (rescinding the Morton Memos).
74. Id. at 2-8.
75. The full list of enforcement priorities:
Priority I
(a) Noncitizens apprehended at the border while attempting to enter the United States.
(b) Felons, as defined by state or federal law.
(c) Aggravated felons, as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act.
(d) "Aliens engaged in or suspected of terrorism or espionage."
(e) Noncitizens who "pose a danger to national security."
Priority 2
(a) Noncitizens with three or more misdemeanor, non-traffic convictions.
(b) Noncitizens with a conviction for a "significant misdemeanor," a new term of arm
meaning:
an offense of domestic violence; sexual abuse or exploitation; burglary; un-
lawful possession or use of a firearm; drug distribution or trafficking; or driv-
ing under the influence; or if not an offense listed above, one for which the
2016] 679
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
forcement priorities closely track the Obama Administration's
policy of prioritizing convicted criminals and enhanced border pa-
trol, while deprioritizing unauthorized immigrants who have
been in the country for some time and who have no criminal rec-
ord." Thus, a person will be a priority for deportation if she en-
tered the country since January 1, 2014, or is caught at the bor-
der, or if she has certain serious criminal convictions (or any
three non-traffic misdemeanors)." This suggests that non-recent
arrivals who have no criminal record may be left alone; although,
the policy does not guarantee this."
Simple non-enforcement of immigration law has been over-
shadowed by a new initiative that took a very different approach
to immigration discretion. On June 15, 2012, as his re-election
campaign accelerated, President Obama went to the Rose Garden
to announce a new immigration initiative.7 ' He lamented that
Congress had failed to pass either comprehensive immigration re-
form or the DREAM Act, which would have benefited immigrants
brought to the United States illegally by their families and who
went to school in the United States; he then announced the pro-
gram now known as DACA." He called it "a temporary stopgap
individual was sentenced to time in custody of 90 days or more (the sentence
must involve time to be served in custody, and does not include a suspended
sentence)
(c) Noncitizens who cannot show they were physically present in the U.S. since January
1, 2014.
(d) Significant abusers of visa waiver programs.
Priority 3
(a) Noncitizens subject to a removal order issued after January 1, 2014.
Id. at 3-4.
76. Id.; See Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: Im-
migration Accountability Executive Action (Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.whitehouse.gov/
the-press-office/2014/11/20/fact-sheet-immigration-accountability-executive-action.
77. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to
Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Customs and Immigration Enft, et al., supra,
note 73, at 4.
78. Id. at 5. ("Nothing in this memorandum should be construed to prohibit or dis-
courage the apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens unlawfully in the United States
who are not identified as priorities herein. However, resources should be dedicated, to the
greatest degree possible, to the removal of aliens described in the priorities set forth
above, commensurate with the level of prioritization identified.").
79. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15,
2012), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigr
ation.
80. See Kalhan, Deferred Action, supra note 18, at 61; Press Release, The White
House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 76.
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measure that lets us focus our resources wisely while giving a de-
gree of relief and hope to talented, driven, patriotic young peo-
ple."" He discussed his policy of prioritizing deportation of non-
citizens with criminal records, and said that DACA was a means
by which "we've improved on that discretion."82
DACA built on the pre-existing legal mechanisms of deferred
action, by which beneficiaries of prosecutorial discretion have
been formally told that the government had decided not to deport
them." Deferred action in immigration typically includes some-
thing more than simple non-enforcement of a statute. It informs
the beneficiary of the no enforcement decision and tells her that
she need not worry, at least for a certain period of time. The No-
tice of Action sent to beneficiaries states that DHS "has decided
to defer action in your case," which is analogous to a prosecutor
telling a suspect that she has decided not to press charges at the
present time.8 The deferred action notice indicates that the deci-
sion remains in place "unless terminated."" To be clear, deferred
action grants only a reprieve, not a visa.8 6 Nevertheless, because
the law enforcement agency informs the beneficiary of the deci-
sion, deferred action is conceptually distinct from many other
forms of prosecutorial discretion in which the beneficiary may not
even know that discretion was exercised in her favor.
In terms of its human impact, the most important benefit of de-
ferred action may be its implications for legal employment. De-
ferred action beneficiaries receive a notice with the promise that
"[a]n Employment Authorization Document [("EAD")] will arrive
separately in the mail."" This EAD, a credit card-sized identifica-
tion document, affords the right to obtain a Social Security num-
ber." In many states, an EAD can be the basis for obtaining a
81. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, supra note 76.
82. Id.
83. See Wadhia, Role of Discretion, supra note 27, at 248 (describing the history of de-
ferred action).
84. See 1-797 Notice of Action, Dep't of Homeland Security (on file with author).
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), U.S. CITIZENSHIP
& IMMIGRATION SERVS., http://www.uscis.govfhumanitarian/consideration-deferred-action-
childhood-arrivals-daca (last updated Aug. 3, 2015).
88. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., RM 10211.420 EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION FOR NON-
IMMIGRANTS, https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/Inx/0110211420 (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
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driver's license or even facilitate professional licensure." In July
2015, a survey reported that 96% of DACA recipients were em-
ployed or in school, and that they are buying automobiles at high-
er rates than prior to the DACA.o Among the respondents, 69%
reported moving to a job with better pay, and 54% reported mov-
ing to a job with better working conditions." The study found that
DACA increased average hourly wages from $11.92 to $17.29 per
hour.9 2
The criteria for eligibility to apply for DACA in its original form
are fairly simple and straightforward. According to the USCIS
website, noncitizens may request deferred action under DACA if
they:
1. Were under the age of 31 as of June 15, 2012;
2. Came to the United States before reaching [their] 16th birthday;
3. Have continuously resided in the United States since June 15,
2007, up to the present time;
4. Were physically present in the United States on June 15, 2012,
and at the time of making [their] request for consideration of de-
ferred action with USCIS;
5. Had no lawful status on June 15, 2012;
6. Are currently in school, have graduated or obtained a certificate
of completion from high school, have obtained a general educa-
tion development (GED) certificate, or are an honorably dis-
charged veteran of the Coast Guard or Armed Forces of the Unit-
ed States; and
7. Have not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, or
three or more other misdemeanors, and do not otherwise pose a
threat to national security or public safety.9 3
USCIS made an application form available for DACA, the I-
812D, which looks much like any other immigration application
form.94 Importantly, the costs of processing the applications are
paid for by the application fee of $465 (including $85 for a bio-
89. See DACA and Driver's Licenses, NAT'L IMMIGRATION L. CTR., http://www.nilc.org
/driverlicenses.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2015).
90. Tom K. Wong et. al., Results from a Nationwide Survey of DACA Recipients Illus-
trate the Program's Impact, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (July 9, 2015), http://www.american
progress.orglissues/immigration/news/2015/07/09/117054/results-from-a-nationwide-sur
vey-of-daca-recipients-illustrate-the-programs-impact.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 87.
94. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., Form I-821D, Consideration of Deferred
Action for Childhood Arrivals (2014), http://www.uscis.govfhumanitarian/consideration-
deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-daca.
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metric criminal background check)." This self-financing mecha-
nism made it difficult for Congress to block DACA and DAPA
through the appropriations process.
While simple non-enforcement of immigration law has a clear
analogy to prosecutorial discretion in the criminal context, prose-
cutors do not actually issue permits to let people continue to en-
gage in unlawful activity." While non-enforcement of the law
leaves people essentially as they were, the grant of employment
authorization leaves DACA recipients substantially better off. In
theory and in practice, DHS can grant deferred action to any de-
portable person." But DACA made deferred action a more defined
benefit for which a person applies, knowing that he or she meets
the eligibility criteria." Thus, on the surface it appears that the
Obama Administration is granting significant immigration bene-
fits to people who, according to statute, are ineligible to even en-
ter the country. 00
In November 2014, President Obama announced two additional
programs that followed DACA's general format. An expanded
version of DACA would remove the age restriction that limited
the original program to those who were under thirty-one in June
2012.0 Thus, a person who entered the U.S. before age sixteen
three decades ago could be eligible.102 A new program, DAPA,
would give deferred action to unauthorized immigrants who had
U.S. citizen children and who had been in the country since Jan-
95. Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 87.
96. See Jennifer Bendery, House Appropriations Committee Confirms Congress Can't
Defund Obama's Immigration Action, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 20, 2014, 11:49 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/20/defund-obama-immigration-action- n 6191958.html.
97. See Kate M. Manuel & Todd Garvey, Cong. Research Serv., Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Immigration Enforcement: Legal Issues 9-11 (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R4
2924.pdf.
98. See Memorandum from Jeh Johnson, Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to Le6n
Rodrigeuz, Dir., U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and
with Respect to Certain Individuals Who Are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent
Residents (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_me
mo_deferred-action.pdf.
99. See Consideration of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note
87.
100. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (defining classes of excludable noncitizens).
101. Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS.,
http://www.uscis.gov/immigrationaction (last updated Apr. 15, 2015); see Consideration of
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), supra note 87.
102. Executive Actions on Immigration, supra note 101.
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uary 2010.20 DAPA thus potentially includes millions of unau-
thorized immigrants who had children born in the United States.
The DHS planned to hire around 1000 new employees to process
the applications."o But the expanded DACA and DAPA programs
were delayed by the injunction in the Texas case. a0
II. THE CHALLENGES TO EXECUTIVE ACTION
A. Frontline Resistance
As we have seen in Part I.B, the Obama Administration did not
publicly emphasize prosecutorial discretion as an important im-
migration policy tool until the latter part of the President's first
term. The Morton Memos were not issued until 2011 and led to
considerable frustration as they promised a more lenient ap-
proach than immigrant activists saw in the field. DACA then fol-
lowed the next year, as the President was campaigning for a se-
cond term. This shift was undoubtedly linked to the dimming
prospects for congressional action on immigration reform. Indeed,
the Administration's interest in executive action grew propor-
tionately as prospects for legislation diminished. But the Admin-
istration's evolving approach to executive action also reflected a
struggle within the Executive Branch.
At the dawn of the Obama Administration, Professors Cox and
Rodriguez argued that the President had considerable power to
shift immigration policy without congressional action, as this ar-
ticle explained supra at Part I.A. But shortly before the an-
nouncement of the DACA program, Professor Mariano-Florentino
Cu6llar articulated an important note of skepticism about presi-
dential power after serving as co-chair for immigration of the
Obama-Biden transition, and then as a White House domestic
policy advisor during the first two years of the Obama Admin-
istration.o Cu6llar contended that it was a mistake to view the
103. Id.
104. Stephen Dinan, Homeland Security Already Hiring 1,000 Employees to Carry Out
Obama Amnesty, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.cominews/2014
/dec/3/dhs-hiring-1000-employees-carry-out-obama-amnesty/lpage=all.
105. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
106. Associate Justice Mariano-Florentino Cullar, CAL. COURTS, http://www.courts.
ca.gov/28724.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2015). Cullar is now a justice on the California Su-
preme Court. Id.
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political stalemate on immigration as a purely legislative mat-
ter.o' He argued that by creating and funding a fragmented but
large immigration enforcement apparatus, Congress had created
powerful organizational interests within the Executive Branch
that buttressed a dysfunctional immigration policy embodied in
the statute.'08 These interests ensured considerable continuity in
aggressive immigration enforcement from one presidential ad-
ministration to the next.o' In other words, they acted as a signifi-
cant constraint on presidential discretion."o
With a large number of enforcement officers hired before 2009,
and increasingly efficient mechanisms in place to apprehend im-
migrants, Cu6llar wrote that the Obama Administration in its
early years had difficulty reigning in or re-directing the massive
deportation machinery that it inherited."' He noted that in the
first two years of the Obama Presidency, there were "considerable
challenges that senior administration officials have encoun-
tered ... in asserting control over the routine actions of lower-
level enforcers who have increasing access . . . to detained indi-
viduals who have not been found guilty of committing crimes."1 2
Cullar's account of entrenched Executive Branch interests
constraining the President's power was published in the early
part of 2012. It represented an astute description of the state of
affairs roughly a year after the Morton Memos, but several
months before DACA. This was a time of considerable frustration
for advocates of immigration reform, and-one may speculate-
for the Administration itself. There were complaints that immi-
grants were still being aggressively pursued by law enforcement,
despite the public announcement of prosecutorial discretion poli-
cies."'
As the Obama Administration shifted its focus toward execu-
tive action on immigration, it had to find a strategy by which to
translate the policy goals of the President into changes in behav-
ior by frontline enforcement agents. This was no easy task. In
107. Cu6lar, supra note 29, at 58.
108. See id. at 51-54.
109. See id. at 54-55.
110. See id. at 53-54.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 54.
113. See id. at 6.
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particular, the ICE officers' union (known as the National ICE
Council) had become a vocal public critic of the Administration's
policies. In January 2012, the union, which represents 7000 ICE
officers, blocked efforts by the DHS to train its members on how
to prioritize deportation cases and exercise discretion. 4 Overcom-
ing this challenge takes more than reiterating the legal founda-
tion of prosecutorial discretion. As noted in Part I.A., the Su-
preme Court has embraced consideration of "immediate human
concerns.""' However, not everyone perceives the weight of these
concerns the same way. The factors that might be compelling rea-
sons to defer deportation in a particular case to senior Obama of-
ficials might not seem compelling to the ICE agents who actually
process deportation cases.
The challenge that the Obama Administration faced is common
whenever one tries to induce a government agency to exercise
self-restraint against what it sees as its core mission. This insight
has recently been highlighted by Professor Margo Schlanger in
her study of the Office of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties in the
DHS."' Her study focused on why "[i]nducing governmental or-
ganizations to do the right thing" is inherently difficult "when
'the right thing' means executing not only a primary mission but
also constraints on that mission . . . .""' Schlanger built on sociol-
ogist James Q. Wilson's description of the power of a shared
"sense of mission" within a bureaucracy." For present purposes,
Schlanger's important insight is that it is always a challenge to
get an enforcement agency to incorporate values that compete
with its own primary sense of purpose, even when the change is
desired by nominally superior elected officials."' Schlanger, like
Cu6lar, offers an explanation for why democratically elected of-
fice holders may have less ability than often assumed to change
114. Julia Preston, Agents' Union Stalls Training on Deportation Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 7, 2012) [hereinafter Preston, Agents' Union], http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/us
/illegal-immigrants-who-commit-crimes-focus-of-deportation.html.
115. See discussion supra Part I.A.
116. Margo Schlanger, Offices of Goodness: Influence Without Authority in Federal
Agencies, 36 CARDoZO L. REV. 53, 103 (2014).
117. Id. at 54.
118. Id. at 103 (quoting JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING FBI AND
NARcoTIcS AGENTS 14 (1978)).
119. See id. at 103.
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how laws are enforced at the frontlines by unelected, largely
anonymous civil servants and law enforcement officers.'20
For an immigrant advocate critical of aggressive immigration
enforcement, it might seem that ICE agents are simply heartless
because they energetically detain and deport sympathetic immi-
grants. But the point that Cu6llar and Schlanger make is broader
in application and less moralistic. It simply assumes that most
people who work in federal agencies believe their work is im-
portant. For example, it assumes that people who work at the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") believe it is important
to protect the environment, that military officers believe it is im-
portant to defend the country through a professional military,
and that people who work in the Anti-Trust Division of the Jus-
tice Department believe it is important to control corporate mo-
nopolies. In a similar vein, it is only natural to assume that peo-
ple who work for ICE believe it is important to enforce
immigration law. The central problem that President Obama has
faced is that it can be a challenge to induce employees of any of
these government agencies to change how they work when the
proposed change seems to conflict with their own understanding
of their agency's core mission and values.
The structure of DACA and DAPA represent a management
strategy by which the Obama Administration effectively over-
came frontline resistance from immigration enforcement
agents.121 The strategy has two important parts.
First, by establishing a new application procedure designed to
attract potentially millions of applications, the Administration
necessitated a large-scale hiring program. USCIS hired hundreds
of additional workers to handle DACA applications in 2012.122 The
120. See id. at 103-05; supra text accompanying notes 103-09.
121. See Arulanantham, supra note 4 ("If supervisory officials like the Secretary of
Homeland Security have authority to prioritize the resources of the agencies they direct,
but field officers ignore their supervisory directives, one might expect that the supervisors
would then have authority to take further steps-beyond those they normally would be
permitted to take-in order to ensure that their priorities are followed. The administra-
tion's new relief program can be understood as exercising authority in just such a situa-
tion. By providing precise criteria for determining who qualifies for low priority status as
well as documentation individuals can use to prove that they have received that designa-
tion, the new program will make it harder for line enforcement agents and attorneys to
ignore the priorities that the administration tried to set three years ago.").
122. Daniel Hanlon, USCIS Ramps Up Hiring for DACA Processing, ASIAN J. (Aug. 28,
2012, 9:03 AM), http://asianjournal.com/immigration/uscis-ramps-up-hiring-for-daca-proc
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Administration planned to hire around 1000 workers to process
an expected surge of applications after the new DAPA and ex-
panded DACA programs went into effect in 2015.123 While justi-
fied by the expected caseload and paid for by the application fees,
hiring new people is also a useful means of combatting en-
trenched resistance from existing employees.1 24 Rather than hav-
ing to persuade longtime DHS personnel to change how they have
long enforced immigration law, DACA and DAPA allow the Ad-
ministration to recruit new people who would be trained from the
beginning under the Administration's new policies.'
Second, DACA and DAPA-as well as the new system of en-
forcement priorities-are defined by clear cut criteria that do not
call on frontline enforcement agents to exercise much judgment.'26
In this way, the announcement of DACA in 2012 signaled an im-
portant shift away from the approach embodied by the Morton
Memos and by prosecutorial discretion policies of the past. While
pre-DACA policies called for an open-ended balancing of factors,
leading ultimately to a value judgment about an individual case,
the new approach is highly prescriptive, making transparent for
all the criteria that the Administration considers warranting a
favorable exercise of discretion.1 27 The value judgments and crite-
ria setting are made at the highest levels of government, while
frontline agents are asked simply to assess eligibility. 2 Clearly,
prescriptive guidelines about when to exercise prosecutorial dis-
cretion takes the power to make judgment calls away from front-
line agents and thus reduces their ability to resist the President's
policies. But as the article will discuss in Part II.C, this prescrip-
tive strategy has been used as a legal vulnerability.
The crucial legal test that DACA and DAPA now face is wheth-
er Presidents can use this managerial strategy to overcome re-
sistance by frontline Executive Branch employees. The remainder
essing/.
123. Michael D. Shear, U.S. Agency Hiring 1,000 After Obama's Immigration Order,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/us/politics/little-noticed-
in-immigration-overhaul-a-government-hiring-rush.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=n
ytcore-iphone-share.
124. See Arulanantham, supra note 4.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
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of this article focuses on this question. Conceptually, this ques-
tion brings up a contest between two different visions of how ad-
ministrative agencies should operate. Under the presidential con-
trol model, Presidents should be able to direct agencies, especially
if they do so publicly (as President Obama has), since the Presi-
dent is accountable to voters and can thus render agencies more
accountable by taking more responsibility for their policies. But
under the deliberative model, agency action is more legitimate if
civil servants can play a greater role in setting policy, ensuring
that policies take greater account of their expertise and are
somewhat insulated from politics. In Part III.D, the article re-
turns to Schlanger and Cu6llar's insights and argues that they
help explain why the deliberative model is a poor fit for the im-
migration context.
B. Initial Legal Challenges to DACA and DAPA
When President Obama announced the original DACA program
in 2012 and again when he announced DAPA and an expansion of
DACA in November 2014, initial objections focused on the claim
that he had usurped the power of Congress."' This included both
public reactions of Republican congressional leaders3 o and from
legal scholars."' In an article published in 2013, Professors Rob-
ert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo argued that the President was
violating his obligation to "take care" to faithfully execute the
laws as they had been enacted by the legislative branch.132 This
argument that the President is violating his constitutional obliga-
tions mirrors an argument raised by ICE agents that they are be-
ing required to violate their oaths."'
In August 2012, several ICE agents and the State of Mississip-
pi sued to try to stop implementation of DACA.'3 4 The named
129. Shear, supra note 123.
130. See, e.g., Bradner & Rosche, supra note 10; Kelly, supra note 10.
131. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Why Congress Can Impeach Obama, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/22/opinion/the-impeachment-of-obama-on-imm
igration-may-be-legal-but-its-wrong.html (arguing that Obama's actions are illegal).
132. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 11, at 785.
133. See generally Josh Blackman, The Constitutionality of DAPA Part I: Congressional
Acquiescence to Deferred Action, 103 GEO. L.J. 96, 97 (2015) (arguing that DACA and
DAPA are unconstitutional).
134. Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d. 724, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2013).
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plaintiff in the case, ICE agent Christopher Crane, also serves as
head of the union that represents ICE agents.1 5 He, along with
Kenneth Palinkas, who heads the union representing USCIS em-
ployees, were previously in the public eye as advocates against
the Senate immigration reform bill.'" In the lawsuit, Crane and
other ICE agents argued that the Morton Memos and the DACA
program required them to violate their oaths to uphold the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States.'" The court dismissed
this challenge on standing and jurisdictional grounds.' In April
2015, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that neither
the state of Mississippi nor the ICE agents had shown a sufficient
injury-in-fact to establish standing.'
Within weeks of the DAPA/DACA announcements of November
2014, the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania found that the President's policies were unconstitu-
tional because they invaded the authority of Congress.o Howev-
er, that finding has been disputed by another federal court, ques-
tioning whether the issue should even have been raised in that
case." Moreover, the Pennsylvania decision posed no immediate
threat to the program's implementation. Another federal district
court dismissed a challenge by the Sheriff of Maricopa County,
Arizona, finding both a lack of standing and emphasizing the
general validity of prosecutorial discretion in immigration.1 42
Thus, the initial challenges to DACA and DAPA based on the
claim that deferred action programs violated the duty to execute
the laws bore little fruit for opponents of the programs.
The Administration received a warning that DACA and DAPA
might pose significant legal problems through the Office of Legal
135. Stephen Dinan, GOP Lawmakers Want Obama to Hear out Head of ICE Union,
WASH. TIMES (May 24, 2013), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/24/gop-law
makers-want-obama-to-hear-out-head-of-ice-ul.
136. Id.
137. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d at 734-35.
138. Id. at 747.
139. Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 255 (5th Cir. 2015).
140. See United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 779, 788 (W.D. Pa. 2014)
(concluding that the Obama policies are unconstitutional in a case concerning a criminal
conviction).
141. See Arpaio v. Obama, 27 F. Supp. 3d 185, 208 n.12 (D.D.C. 2014) (disputing the
Juarez-Escobar decision on jurisdictional grounds and defending the norm of prosecutorial
discretion).
142. Id. at 190, 207-10.
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Counsel's ("OLC") review of the November 2014 executive ac-
tions."' The OLC called DACA and DAPA "class-based" deferred
action programs and warned that such programs posed a particu-
lar problem unless they incorporate an individualized, case-by-
case review with room to deviate from general rules in individual
cases. 1 4 The OLC noted that, unlike a pure decision to not enforce
a law in a particular case, deferred action "represents a decision
to openly tolerate an undocumented alien's continued presence"
and "carries with it benefits in addition to non-enforcement it-
self."14 5 Rather than merely enable immigration enforcement of-
ficers to exercise discretion, "class-based deferred action pro-
grams . . . set forth certain threshold eligibility criteria and then
invite individuals who satisfy these criteria to apply for deferred
action status."146
The fact that DACA and DAPA use clear threshold criteria to
define a class of beneficiaries has become a central issue in the
litigation about the programs, but it was not immediately clear
why the OLC thought it a problem. The OLC concluded that "the
establishment of threshold eligibility criteria can serve to avoid
arbitrary enforcement decisions by individual officers, thereby
furthering the goal of ensuring consistency across a large agen-
cy."'4 The OLC framed the issue in separation of powers terms
and concluded that "individualized, case-by-case review helps
avoid potential concerns that, in establishing such eligibility cri-
teria, the Executive is attempting to rewrite the law . . . .,,148 While
initial legal challenges focused on the concern that the Executive
might be usurping Congress's role in setting immigration law, the
fight quickly moved to a new question: do DACA and DAPA un-
lawfully strip frontline immigration officers of their power to ex-
ercise discretion on a case-by-case basis because they have not
gone through a notice-and-comment process?
143. The Dep't of Homeland Sec.'s Auth. to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Un-
lawfully Present in the U.S. and to Defer Removal of Others, 38 OP. O.L.C. 1, 15, 18, 20,
33 (2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olcopinions/attachments/2014/11/20/20
14-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf (referring to "class-based deferred action" and the
"categorical variety" of deferred action).
144. Id. at 18 n.8, 22-23.
145. Id. at 20.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 23.
148. Id.
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C. The Texas Attack on DACA and DAPA
The case that has proven to be the gravest threat to the DACAl
DAPA programs has been Texas v. United States, a challenge
joined by twenty-six states (or state governors in some cases). In
February 2015, Judge Andrew Hanen of the Southern District of
Texas issued a preliminary injunction against implementation of
DAPA and the expanded DACA program.'49 A request for an
emergency stay of the injunction was denied in a split 2-1 deci-
sion by Judge Jerry Smith of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit on May 26, 2015.2"o In November, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed the preliminary injunction, again in a 2-1 decision, with
Judge Smith again writing the majority decision. 5 ' The Depart-
ment of Justice has asked the Supreme Court to review that deci-
*152
sion.12
This case involves significant disputes about reviewability and
standing, which, if they had been resolved in the federal govern-
ment's favor, would have ended the litigation.' However, this ar-
ticle does not delve into these questions. What is most important
for present purposes is how the arguments on the merits have
shifted. As we have seen, initially the central objection to DACA
and DAPA was that the programs violated the Constitution, spe-
cifically the Take Care Clause and, more generally, the separa-
tion of powers between the Executive and Legislative branches.'54
This concern subsequently fell into the background as the Texas
case proceeded.
Instead of focusing on a constitutional separation of powers
theory, the APA procedural argument focuses on a violation of
section 553 of the Administrative Procedure Act because the ex-
149. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 604, 677 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
150. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 769 (5th Cir. 2015) (denying the motion
to stay the injunction issued by the district court pending appeal).
151. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *1 (5th Cir. 2015)
152. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, United States v. Texas, No. 15-674 (S. Ct. Nov. 20,
2015), http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/cert-petition-filed-case-texas-vs-united-states.
153. See Texas, 2015 WL 6873190 at *3.
154. See id. (noting the states argued that DAPA violated the Take Care Clause of the
Constitution); United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 776, 786 (explaining
the separation of powers issues raised by President Obama's executive action and holding
that the President impermissibly crossed the line between legislating and executing the
law).
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panded DACA and DAPA programs were not submitted for notice
and comment."' The technical question regarding section 553 is
whether DACA and DAPA represent legislative rules, in which
case notice and comment is required, or "interpretive rules, gen-
eral statements of policy, or rules of agency organization, proce-
dure, or practice," in which case it is not.156 Distinguishing these
two types of rules is a classic problem of administrative law,
which this article will explore in detail in Part III.
The court of appeals affirmed Judge Hanen's finding that the
DACA/DAPA rules are binding and thus required a notice-and-
comment process, because they do not leave DHS employees free
to exercise genuine discretion on a case-by-case basis.'"' Both the
district court and the court of appeals relied on statistics showing
that only 5% of applications for DACA have been denied and on a
declaration by the President of the union representing USCIS
staff.' 8 In the declaration, the union chief said that "DACA appli-
cations are simply rubberstamped if the applicants meet the nec-
essary criteria.""' In short, because the DACA/DAPA criteria are
for the most part clear-cut, DHS employees are left little flexibil-
ity to make their own case-by-case assessments. The Obama Ad-
ministration has always argued that they are not binding because
they are discretionary and a rejected applicant cannot go to court
to force the government to grant deferred action."6 o That is, DACA
and DAPA are not binding for a member of the public against
DHS. Nonetheless, Texas and other states have argued that
DACA and DAPA are legislative because they are binding for the
agents who decide each application. Moreover, a general criteria
for the deferred action program is that the applicant "present no
other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of
deferred action inappropriate."16
155. Texas, 787 F.3d at 762; Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 603, 671 (S.D.
Tex. 2015).
156. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
157. See Texas, 2015 WL 6873190, at *18-21; Texas, 787 F.3d at 763-67.
158. See Texas, 2015 WL 6873190, at *19; Texas, 787 F.3d at 763-64.
159. Texas, 787 F.3d at 764.
160. But see Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge:
Examining the Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV.
LATINO L. REV. 39, 57-63 (2013) [hereinafter Wadhia, Role of Judiciary] (arguing that de-
ferred action decisions may be judicially reviewable under the APA).
161. Texas, 2015 WL 6873190, at *30 (King, J., dissenting).
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Even if the "rubberstamp" theory of DACA and DAPA is cor-
rect, this article argues that the court of appeals and the district
court made a fundamental legal error. In short, they misunder-
stood what it means for an agency policy to be binding. At this
stage, it is important to observe how the focus on administrative
law, rather than constitutional separation of powers, shifts the
legal debate. The thrust of the constitutional argument against
President Obama's executive actions is that the DACA and DAPA
programs are beyond the President's authority and cannot be im-
plemented without congressional authorization. By contrast, the
administrative argument does not challenge the President's au-
thority to establish these programs. Instead, the argument is
simply that he established them using the wrong procedure and,
in practical terms, too quickly because DHS did not make a for-
mal public notice about its intention to engage in rulemaking fol-
lowed by publication of a draft rule, a period of public comments,
and, finally, publication of a final rule.'6 2
This shift to administrative law changes the debate in two key
ways. First, so long as the focus is on the APA, it is not about the
separation of power between the Legislative and Executive
branches. Instead, the question is entirely about how the Execu-
tive Branch should operate. This shift is not surprising given-as
discussed in Part L.A-there is extensive case law supporting the
authority of immigration agencies to choose not to enforce immi-
gration statutes in every case. As a result, those challenging im-
migration non-enforcement confront a difficult legal terrain if
they want to argue that DHS cannot grant deferred action to non-
citizens who are technically deportable. Second, the administra-
tive law challenge turns on the question of who within the Execu-
tive Branch may exercise discretion. The fact that the head of a
union of DHS employees provided critical support to the Texas
challenge illustrates that there is significant tension within the
Executive Branch about immigration enforcement. Instead of an
inter-branch separation of powers question, the legal struggle
162. See Texas, 787 F.3d at 745-46 ("First, [the states] claimed that DAPA is procedur-
ally unlawful under the APA because it is a substantive rule that is required to undergo
notice and comment, but DHS had not followed those procedures."). The states, in the al-
ternative, also asserted that DHS lacked authority for DAPA and that the program vio-
lates the Take Care Clause. But these were secondary, alternative arguments. Id. at 746.
The district court did not address these latter arguments, focusing instead on the notice
and comment argument. Id.
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over DACA and DAPA evolved into a struggle between parts of
the Executive Branch. At the time of writing (June-August 2015),
this litigation was still evolving.
III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PROBLEM
A. Overview
This section surveys the administrative law terrain in which
the Obama immigration actions have emerged. Part B describes
the difference in the APA between legislative rules, which must
go through notice and comment, and nonlegislative rules, which
do not. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has taken the
lead in trying to delineate the difference between these catego-
ries, but it has not been wholly successful in doing So.'"6 In the
Texas case, too much stress has been placed on particular phrases
that the D.C. Circuit has used in some decisions. In short, the
D.C. Circuit has found that legislative rules are distinctive be-
cause they are "binding," but it has not been consistent about ex-
actly what this means.16 In some cases, the D.C. Circuit seemed
to say that a notice-and-comment process is required if an agency
rule seeks to bind frontline decision makers,"' a premise that op-
erates as the lynchpin of the Fifth Circuit's preliminary injunc-
tion against DACA and DAPA. But the D.C. Circuit has never
been consistent about the framing of this definition, and in these
cases, it appears to use loose phraseology that should not be ap-
plied strictly or literally. Moreover, the D.C. Circuit's most recent
decisions appear to back away from the approach that the Fifth
Circuit is now following.
Part C of this section argues that it is more useful to think
about DACA and DAPA in the context of broader concerns about
the place of administrative discretion in our constitutional de-
mocracy, rather than focus on inconsistent dicta and word choice
from the D.C. Circuit. There is rich scholarly literature setting
163. See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manu-
als, and the Like-Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.
1311, 1321 (1992).
164. See infra Part III.B.
165. See, e.g., Cmty. Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (quot-
ing American Bus. Ass'n v. United States, 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
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out alternative conceptions about how best to ensure that agency
policy making will retain democratic legitimacy and be subject to
checks and balances. The Obama immigration actions are easily
justifiable under the theory that the President should be able to
control executive agencies (at least under certain circumstances),
because this control provides a mechanism by which agency be-
havior may be accountable to the electorate.
Part D of this section summarizes contrary visions of adminis-
trative action that oppose presidential control. These visions typi-
cally argue that agency action will be more legitimate if civil
servants inside the agency are given more influence through a de-
liberative rulemaking process. This is a reasonable approach in
certain policy-making contexts, especially when Congress has
specified that it wants regulatory policy to be set by technical ex-
pertise rather than by political considerations. However, these
arguments are not convincing in the immigration enforcement
context.
B. The D.C. Circuit's Confused Focus on "Binding" Rules
Section 553 of the APA requires a notice-and-comment process
for "rulemaking."16 6 A "rule" is defined as a "statement of general
or particular applicability and future effect.""' On its face, notice-
and-comment seems to be a fairly simple process, so it may be un-
clear why the Administration would not choose to utilize it and
thus avoid the kind of challenges that have delayed DACA and
DAPA. Rulemaking requires public notice of a proposed rule,
which is meant to allow all members of the public affected by a
rule the opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process and
to enhance political accountability."' It requires publishing a no-
tice that the agency intends to engage in rulemaking, publication
of a proposed rule, an opportunity for public comment, considera-
tion of public comments, and publication of a final rule which can
go into effect thirty days later.'6 9
166. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (c) (2012).
167. Id. § 551(4).
168. See 1 RICHARD H. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 497 (5th ed. 2010).
169. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d).
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Rulemaking under section 553 comes with significant down-
sides.1o Even though an agency does not need congressional ap-
proval to issue a rule, the notice-and-comment process can be ex-
tremely time consuming and burdensome on an agency's
resources.'" These burdens extend not only to issuing new rules,
but also to rescinding rules.1 72 Thus, to require rulemaking under
section 553 is to significantly limit an agency's flexibility. For
these reasons, there has been significant concern that agencies
seek to avoid rulemaking when they can.'7 3 One might also sug-
gest that the difficulty of rulemaking can undermine one of its
goals: to enhance political accountability. Once a final rule is in
force, a notice-and-comment process requirement makes it more
difficult to change the rule, even if a new President is elected on a
platform proposing to do just that.1 7 4
Section 553 does not apply to "general statements of policy." 7 5
This creates a classic problem of administrative law: how to dis-
tinguish a legislative "rule" from a "general statement of policy"
(general statements of policy and interpretive rules are often re-
ferred to as nonlegislative rules). 7 1 In Chrysler Corp. v. Brown in
1979, and again in Lincoln v. Vigil in 1993, the Supreme Court
stated that the definition of a general statement of policy is a
statement "issued by an agency to advise the public prospectively
of the manner in which the agency proposes to exercise a discre-
tionary power."' The Supreme Court has thus apparently
stressed the value of encouraging agencies to inform the public
about how they will use their discretion. 7 But the Chrysler and
Vigil definition in many ways begs the question. A legislative rule
that is subject to section 553 would also presumably inform the
170. See Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985
DUKE L.J. 381, 403-04 (1985) (discussing the resource and time burdens of rulemaking).
171. Id. at 404 (estimating that rulemaking on non-controversial issues takes six to
twelve months, and longer on controversial issues); see also KRISTIN E. HICKMAN &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 425 (2010).
172. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insur. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 38 (1983).
173. See HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 171, at 513-14.
174. See infra Part IV.A.
175. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2012).
176. See Asimow, supra note 170, at 381.
177. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 n.31 (1979); Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S.
182, 197 (1993) (quoting Chrysler Corp., 441 U.S. at 302 n.31)).
178. See Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 313-15.
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public about how an agency will exercise power in the future.
Therefore, it is not entirely clear from this definition how legisla-
tive and nonlegislative rules and policy statements differ. The
Supreme Court has avoided delving much deeper into the policy-
rule distinction; although, as discussed below, in its 2015 term
the Court reiterated the principle that notice-and-comment re-
quirements need not always apply.'" The Texas case could give
the Supreme Court an opportunity to fill this void.
In the absence of clearer guidance from the Supreme Court, it
has thus been left largely to the Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit to flesh out the difference between a policy statement and
a legislative rule. In its first important decision on the subject,
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Federal Power Commission, the D.C.
Circuit found that the concept of a legislative rule should not be
construed broadly, since Congress clearly meant to carve out a
significant exception for general statements of policy."' General
statements of policy are useful, the court of appeals reasoned, be-
cause they "encourage[] public dissemination of the agency's poli-
cies prior to their actual application.""' The distinguishing fea-
ture of a policy statement is that it does not have "the force of
law."'82 It is not a "binding norm.""' A policy statement announces
an agency's "tentative intentions for the future," without creating
a binding, enforceable rule.'84 In this seminal case on the policy-
rule distinction, the D.C. Circuit echoed the Supreme Court's fo-
cus on encouraging agencies to inform the public about how they
planned to use their discretion and thus sounded a relatively pos-
itive note about the utility of general policy statements that did
not go through notice and comment.' 5 In Pacific Gas, the D.C.
Circuit reasoned that it is a good thing for agencies to be able to
announce tentative policies without going through notice and
179. See Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203 (2015); Vigil, 508 U.S.
at 196-97 ("Determining whether an agency's statement is what the APA calls a 'rule' can
be a difficult exercise. We need not conduct that exercise in this case, however.").
180. 506 F.2d 33, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
181. Id. at 38.
182. See id.
183. Id. (quoting Reginald Parker, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Study in Over-
estimation, 60 YALE. L.J. 581, 598 (1951)).
184. Id.
185. See id.
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comment because this possibility discourages the agency from
keeping its "initial views" secret.'
Although Pacific Gas was the basis for subsequent case law,
the tone of later D.C. Circuit case law shifted toward increasing
concern that agencies were overusing the exception to the notice-
and-comment process. The D.C. Circuit developed a two-part test
in Community Nutrition Institute v. Young (CN)'7 and American
Business Ass'n v. United States.'" First, a general statement of
policy "is one that does not impose any rights and obligations.""
Second, a policy statement "genuinely leaves the agency and its
decision makers free to exercise discretion."' This second part
has become the pivotal issue in the DACA/DAPA litigation. The
current legal problem stems from the D.C. Circuit's reference in
CNI to "the agency and its decisionmakers.""' The insertion of
these words-"and its decisionmakers"-raises a question wheth-
er the agency as a whole must be free to exercise discretion or
whether each and every frontline decision maker must be free to
exercise discretion on an individual basis.
This phrasing from the D.C. Circuit's decision in CNI was
quoted in the key Fifth Circuit case distinguishing legislative
rules from non-binding policy statements.'92 This phrase then be-
came the doctrinal lynchpin for the court of appeals decision af-
firming the injunction in the Texas case.' This article will now
explain that a great deal depends on these precise words, which is
a problem because it is not at all clear that the D.C. Circuit has
always been careful about its choice of words.
There are two possible ways in which an agency statement may
be binding so as to be considered a rule under the APA. Under the
first possibility, a statement is a binding rule if it binds the agen-
cy vis-A-vis the public. That is, a statement would fall under sec-
186. Id.
187. 818 F.2d 943, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
188. 627 F.2d 525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
189. Id.
190. CNI, 818 F.2d at 946 (quoting Am. Bus. Ass'n, 627 F.2d at 529).
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. See Prof ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 595 (5th Cir.
1995).
193. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *18 (5th Cir.
2015).
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tion 553's notice-and-comment requirement if it would prevent
the agency from changing course or deviating in an individual
case and allow a would-be beneficiary to ask a court to mandate
the agency to follow the policy. Under the second possibility, a
statement is a binding rule if it forces agency employees to decide
cases in a prescribed way, without a meaningful role for individu-
alized judgment calls by frontline staff. Under this view, it is ir-
relevant whether the public would be able to force the agency to
take certain action. What matters is that the agency's employees
are bound by their superiors, who issue the prescribed criteria
and thus constrain the discretion of frontline staff. Critically, this
second possibility gives lower level employees in federal agencies
considerably more power because it would force their superiors to
go through an arduous notice-and-comment process in order to
prescribe them how to handle individual cases. It would become
more difficult for their superiors to tell them how to exercise dis-
cretion.
It is not clear why the D.C. Circuit included the critical words
"and its decisionmakers" in CN 1 94 and thus it may be problemat-
ic jurisprudence to place so much stress on such brief dicta. Be-
fore CNI, the D.C. Circuit referred more obliquely to binding
rules as a type of policy statement that "limits administrative
discretion."'" Moreover, there is little indication from other cases
decided around the same time that the D.C. Circuit actually
placed much significance on those three words. One year before
CNI, in Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., a panel including
then-Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia and future Supreme Court
nominee Judge Robert Bork found that an "Enforcement Policy"
issued by the Secretary of Labor concerning mine safety was a
nonlegislative rule which did not require notice and comment."'
In that case, the D.C. Circuit found it important that "[t]he lan-
guage of the guidelines is replete with indications that the Secre-
tary retained his discretion to cite production-operators as he saw
fit."... Brock made no mention of any public servants below the
194. 818 F.2d at 946 (quoting Am. Bus. Ass'n, 627 F.2d at 529).
195. Guardian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Fed. Say. & Loan Ins. Corp., 589 F.2d 658,
666-67 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
196. Brock v. Cathedral Bluffs Shale Oil Co., 796 F.2d 533, 538 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
197. Id. at 538 (emphasis added).
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level of the cabinet-level secretary.' One year after CNI, in
McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas, the D.C. Circuit articu-
lated the standard two different ways in the same paragraph:
In practice, there appears some overlap in the Community Nutrition
criteria; the second criterion may well swallow the first. If a state-
ment denies the decisionmaker discretion in the area of its coverage,
so that he, she or they will automatically decline to entertain chal-
lenges to the statement's position, then the statement is binding,
and creates rights or obligations, in the sense those terms are used
in Community Nutrition. The question for purposes of § 553 is
whether a statement is a rule of present binding effect; the answer
depends on whether the statement constrains the agency's discre-
tion."'
The D.C. Circuit's inconsistency in phrasing continued into
twenty-first century cases. In National Ass'n of Broadcasters v.
FCC, the court quoted CNI, but used ellipses in place of the fate-
ful three words ("and its decisionmakers") so that the test was re-
phrased to read "the policy 'genuinely leaves the agency. . . free
to exercise discretion."'2 0 0 The court gave no indication of whether
this was a conscious omission or a stylistic attempt to shorten a
sentence. This inconsistency also appears in the leading Fifth
Circuit case on the subject.2 0 1 This pattern of inconsistent phras-
ing should sound a warning that it may be an error to place too
much significance on the D.C. Circuit's reference to an "agency"
or to a "decision maker." This may simply represent two alterna-
tive means of describing the same thing. After all, the head of an
agency is also a decision maker, and that person's subordinates
usually make decisions by delegation. For example, the immigra-
tion statute assigns enforcement powers explicitly to the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security, and in certain cases, to the Attorney
General, not to individual agents in ICE or USCIS.2 0 2
However, there are some cases from the D.C. Circuit in which
the court gave some additional indication that there may be in-
tentional meaning behind the alternative phrasing. In particular,
198. See id.
199. McLouth Steel Prod. Corp. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1317, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (em-
phasis added).
200. Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 569 F.3d 416, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
201. See Prof ls & Patients for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 596, 601 (5th
Cir. 1995) (stating that notice and comment is not required "as long as the agency remains
free" while in other passages referring to "agency decisionmakers') (emphasis added).
202. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2012).
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in Appalachian Power Co. v. E.P.A., the court expanded on the
idea that a general policy statement may not be binding on front-
line decision makers:
If an agency acts as if a document issued at headquarters is control-
ling in the field, if it treats the document in the same manner as it
treats a legislative rule, if it bases enforcement actions on the poli-
cies or interpretations formulated in the document, if it leads private
parties or State permitting authorities to believe that it will declare
permits invalid unless they comply with the terms of the document,
then the agency's document is for all practical purposes "binding.""'
Appalachian Power has been understood as a step toward tight-
ening the definition of nonlegislative rules in order to prevent
agencies from circumventing the notice-and-comment process.
But its tighter, more skeptical approach to policy statements con-
trasts with a 2015 Supreme Court case that-much like Pacific
Gas-seemed more favorable to the idea that avoiding notice and
comment is not always a bad thing. In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers
Ass'n, the Supreme Court said:
Not all "rules" must be issued through the notice-and-comment pro-
cess . . . [T]he critical feature of interpretive rules is that they are
"issued by an agency to advise the public of the agency's construction
of the statutes and rules which it administers." The absence of a no-
tice-and-comment obligation makes the process of issuing interpre-
tive rules comparatively easier for agencies than issuing legislative
rules. But that convenience comes at a price: Interpretive rules "do
not have the force and effect of law and are not accorded that weight
in the adjudicatory process.,
20 4
This statement suggests that there may be no particular need to
worry if agencies are opting for general statements of policy in
order to avoid notice and comment, since these statements
achieve the goal of informing the public.
After Perez, the D.C. Circuit decided a case concerning new
Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") guidance that encour-
aged airlines to allow passengers on commercial flights to use
tablet computers during takeoff and landing.2 0 ' The FAA did this
through a guidance document issued to its safety inspectors to as-
203. 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
204. 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203-04 (2015) (quoting Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,
514 U.S. 87, 99 (1995)).
205. Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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sist in interpreting a pre-existing regulation.2 0 6 Arguably, this
guidance notice effectively instructed field inspectors about what
they should consider to be safe for commercial airlines, and it in-
deed led most airlines to change their policies.2 0 7 Although this
might have failed under Appalachian Power, the D.C. Circuit
found that the FAA guidance did not need to go through notice
and comment because it "does not determine any rights or obliga-
tions, or produce legal consequences."2 0 8 In this case, the D.C. Cir-
cuit said that statements of policy "'are binding on neither the
public nor the agency,' and the agency 'retains the discretion and
the authority to change its position . .. in any specific case."'
2 0 9
Under this approach, the central question is whether a statement
can be used by the public to bind the agency.2 1 0
In Texas, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (in the
emergency stay appeal) concluded that DACA and DAPA are sub -
ject to section 553 of the APA because they do not leave frontline
DHS officers free to make individualized decisions, since the pro-
gram criteria are so prescriptive.2 1 ' In this, the Fifth Circuit fol-
lowed some of the D.C. Circuit's case law. But it did not address
in detail the most recent case law on the subject. The central
questions about DACA and DAPA would be whether a person re-
fused deferred action could go to court to force DHS to grant it
and whether the Department could change its policy without no-
tice. Given the track record of the D.C. Circuit on this subject, it
is difficult to know if the doctrinal pendulum has swung meaning-
fully, or if judges simply use a range of alternative phrases for
concepts that they perceive as having the same meaning. But it
does appear that the Fifth Circuit may have been cherry picking
D.C. Circuit case law rather than analyzing its case law as a
whole.
206. Id. at 712.
207. Id. at 714.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 716 (quoting Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997)).
210. See Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94.
211. See Texas v. United States, No. 15-40238, 2015 WL 6873190, at *19 (5th Cir.
2015).
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C. Presidential Control and Administrative Accountability
The D.C. Circuit's inconsistent statements on the relevance of
binding frontline decision makers reflect the weak jurisprudential
pedigree of this concept, stemming from a few stray words in
CNI. But this line of cases reveals that the ambiguity inherent in
the APA is subject to more than one possible interpretation. Ra-
ther than choose arbitrarily among the D.C. Circuit's inconsistent
statements and their possible interpretations, a court should con-
sider the purposes of the provisions in the APA. The Supreme
Court has not provided clarity about the definitional distinction
between legislative and nonlegislative rules, but it has repeatedly
and recently emphasized two points. First, there is great value in
transparency and in publicizing administrative policies. Second,
there is no overriding necessity to always engage in notice and
comment, so long as the interest in transparency is served. One
should note that, in addition to rules and general statements of
policy, there is a third possibility which lurks in the background:
that is, for unstated, ad hoc, or de facto policies to take hold with-
in agencies without any transparency. One of the virtues of gen-
eral statements of policy is that it makes it easier for agencies to
avoid this third, less desirable path.212
In the confusion concerning nonlegislative versus legislative
rulemaking, there is a background question about presidential
power. Specifically, how much power should Presidents have over
the agencies within the Executive Branch? DACA and DAPA are
rooted in a presidential control model by which the President and
his cabinet-level officers may (and sometimes should) direct agen-
cies how to operate. Adopting a more permissive approach toward
nonlegislative rules, by which agency heads have wider latitude
to adopt generally applicable policies without an arduous notice-
and-comment process, gives the heads of agencies-and thus the
President who appoints them-more tools by which to change
agency behavior. This would make it easier for the election of a
new President to usher in a new approach to enforcement, much
as Cox and Rodriguez argued should occur with immigration.213
212. See id. at *40 (King, J., dissenting) ("Requiring each and every policy channeling
prosecutorial discretion to go through the notice-and-comment process would perversely
encourage unwritten, arbitrary enforcement policies.").
213. See supra Part I.
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By contrast, to require a notice-and-comment process in order to
bind frontline decision makers to a discretionary policy would
amount to a substantial obstacle in the way of the President and
his appointed agency heads in shaping how agencies use discre-
tion in the field. As the dissenting judge in the Fifth Circuit's
Texas decision noted, "[A]11 statements of policy channel discre-
tion to some degree-indeed, that is their purpose."21
The question of whether, and to what degree, the President
should control administrative agencies dates back to the New
Deal Era, though it has assumed more prominence since the late
1970s. 2 15 According to some accounts, this question emerged as
early as the Jackson Administration.2 16 Most recently, through
both Republican and Democratic administrations, there has been
a general trend toward greater presidential control over policy
making."' Typically, the primary concern with this trend is that
the expanding power of the presidency may usurp the role of
Congress.21 8 This concern was heightened by the rise of the "uni-
tary executive" theory, especially during the Administration of
George W. Bush.219 In its strongest form, the unitary executive
theory posits that the Constitution assigns executive authority to
the President, and, as a result, Congress may not assign execu-
tive autonomy to any other subordinate agencies.22 o It is worth
noting that the unitary executive theory would support President
Obama's authority to use prosecutorial discretion to reshape im-
migration policy.2 21 But the unitary executive theory is justifiably
controversial because it would constrain Congress's ability both to
214. Texas, 2015 WL 6873190, at *40 (King, J., dissenting) (quoting Prof'ls & Patients
for Customized Care v. Shalala, 56 F.3d 592, 599 (5th Cir. 1995)).
215. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & PAUL R. VERKUIL,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 84-86 (5th ed. 2009) (summarizing arguments for and
against executive control dating to the President's Committee on Administrative Man-
agement in 1937).
216. See Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or "The Decider'? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 706-07 (2007).
217. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 215, at 97.
218. Id. at 85.
219. See id. at 116-17.
220. See Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President's Power to Exe-
cute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 663 (1994) ("[Slince the President's grant of 'the execu-
tive Power' is exclusive, Congress may not create other entities independent of the Presi-
dent and let them exercise his 'executive Power."').
221. See, e.g., id. at 658 (arguing that the President controls prosecutors and all prose-
cutorial discretion is vested in the President).
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check the power of the executive and to make meaningful policy
decisions. Such a concern may be especially acute for agencies
that are largely or completely self-funded, like USCIS.222
One need not adopt the unitary executive theory to find a basis
for the use of executive discretion in the Obama Administration.
The unitary executive theory provocatively posits that Congress
simply cannot assign autonomy to an agency independent of the
President. However, there is considerably more agreement that
the President has the authority, at least, to oversee the Executive
Branch as a general matter, even if Congress may sometimes
make certain agencies more independent.22 3 Under more limited
theories of presidential authority, Congress may choose to limit
presidential power over particular areas of policy by, among other
things, creating an independent agency or by assigning decision-
making power explicitly to inferior officials."' There is some nu-
anced disagreement about how to interpret the more common
scenario whereby the statute assigns decision making to a cabi-
net-level head of agency. Under one view, such congressional del-
egations should be understood as implicitly permitting the Presi-
dent to direct the agency, so long as Congress has not acted more
explicitly to limit such presidential power.2 25 Under another view,
the President would have such authority only if explicitly granted
it by Congress.226 In other words, there is room for debate about
whether power to direct agency policy making should always rest
with the President (the unitary executive), be presumed to rest
with the President unless explicitly withheld by Congress, or be
explicitly granted by Congress.
222. See Charles Kruly, Self-Funding and Agency Independence, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1733, 1735 (2013); WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES (USCIS) FUNCTIONS AND FUNDING, 5-6 (2015),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44038.pdf.
223. See PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 215, at 117 ("Undoubtedly, the power
of the President to control subordinates can be hedged, if not controlled, by congressional
delegations."). See generally Strauss, supra note 216, at 715-16 (noting "common ground"
among varying perspectives on executive authority).
224. PIERCE, SHAPIRO & VERKUIL, supra note 215, at 101, 115.
225. See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2326-31
(2001) [hereinafter Kagan, Presidential Administration]; Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sun-
stein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 84 (1994).
226. See Kevin M. Stack, The President's Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006).
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Fortunately, it is unnecessary to delve any further into these
varying positions in order to wrestle with the Obama immigration
policies. In the case of immigration enforcement policy, Congress
assigned authority explicitly to the DHS Secretary,22 7 and there is
no daylight between the President's position and the Secretary's.
President Obama has taken public ownership of the policies by
announcing and promoting them in high profile speeches and in
White House issued materials.228 But the actual policies are em-
bodied by and implemented through memoranda issued by Secre-
tary Johnson.2 " Thus, even if one adopts a limited view of presi-
dential authority, Congress has explicitly empowered the DHS
Secretary, who implements the President's policies.230 As a result,
the Obama immigration policies do not actually rely on an expan-
sive theory of presidential authority.
Whether authority rests with the President or the DHS Secre-
tary, these are both highly visible officials who gain office either
through a national election or through a highly public confirma-
tion process. Most importantly, these are officials who can lose
their jobs (and will lose their jobs) with the coming of a new ad-
ministration. This fact underlines one of the primary advantages
for democracy in vesting policy-making authority in the highest
political levels of the executive, rather than with anonymous
frontline enforcement officers. Before she was on the Court, then-
Professor Elena Kagan argued that Presidents should use the
power of regulatory agencies to achieve policy goals because they
227. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012).
228. See, e.g., Remarks by the President, supra note 3.
229. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3).
230. The immigration scenario appears different from Obama Administration policy
regarding Guantanamo Bay detainees. In that situation, Congress has authorized the Sec-
retary of Defense (and not the President) to decide when to transfer detainees, and the
Secretary appears to be more reluctant to do so than the President may desire. See Daph-
ne Eviatar, Why Can't Obama Get His Defense Secretary to Release This Guantanamo
Prisoner?, DEFENSE ONE (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2015/08/why-
cant-obama-get-his-defense-secretary-release-guantanamo-prisoner/1 19358/; Tim Mak &
Nancy A. Youssef, The Pentagon Is Keeping Half of Gitmo Locked Up-Against the White
House's Wishes, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 9, 2015, 8:53 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/artic
les/2015/08/09/he-s-keeping-half-of-gitmo-locked-up-against-the-white-house-s-wishes.
html; Paul D. Shinkman, Defense Secretary: Guantanamo Bay Could Stay Open, U.S.
NEWS (Sept. 1, 2015, 1:03 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/01/defense-
secretary-ash-carter-indicates-guantanamo-bay-could-stay-open ("Reports have emerged
in recent weeks citing White House sources complaining [Defense Secretary] Carter is not
moving quickly enough to match Obama's urgency to clear out the prisoners.").
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can be subject to political accountability through elections.231 In
theory, a central rationale for courts to defer to administrative
agencies is that they are subject to political accountability
through the democratic process. As the Supreme Court said in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.:
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of
the Government to make such policy choices-resolving the compet-
ing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not re-
solve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with
the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.m
This emphasis on political accountability supports the theory that
Chevron represents a constitutional orientation in which political
branches of government are presumed to be better suited than
courts to decide questions of public policy. 23 3 This passage from
Chevron also highlights an important tension. Administrative
agencies, on their own, are not very politically accountable, except
through presidential control."'
In Sierra Club v. Costle, the D.C. Circuit held that when agen-
cies engage in rulemaking, the President and his staff in some in-
stances may hold ex parte discussions to influence the agency,
separate from the public notice-and-comment process. 23 5 The court
noted that even though Congress may delegate authority to a cer-
tain agency, the President retains authority to influence the
agency because the Constitution established a unitary executive:
The executive power under our Constitution, after all, is not
shared-it rests exclusively with the President. The idea of a "plural
executive," or a President with a council of state, was considered and
rejected by the Constitutional Convention. Instead the Founders
231. See Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 225, at 2369.
232. 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984).
233. See Mark Seidenfeld, Chevron's Foundation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 273, 289-90
(2011) (tracing a constitutional principle of "policy interference avoidance" to Chief Justice
John Marshall's statement in Marbury v. Madison that "there exists, and can exist, no
power to control that discretion. The subjects are political . . . . The acts of such an officer,
as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts.") (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. 137, 166 (1803).
234. One might also suggest that congressional oversight is an important means of po-
litical accountability, but it is not the one that the Court relied on in Chevron.
235. See 657 F.2d 298, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("The purposes of full-record review which
underlie the need for disclosing ex parte conversations in some settings do not require that
courts know the details of every White House contact, including a Presidential one, in this
informal rulemaking setting.").
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chose to risk the potential for tyranny inherent in placing power in
one person, in order to gain the advantages of accountability fixed on
a single source. . . . The authority of the President to control and su-
pervise executive policymaking is derived from the Constitu-
tio 236tion . . . ."
In a recent article following up on their earlier study of presi-
dential immigration discretion, Professors Cox and Rodriguez al-
so highlight Elena Kagan's argument that centralizing agency
power in the President has important virtues."' Their essential
argument is that constraining frontline discretion with categori-
cal policies does not represent a constitutional problem, as some
claim, because it generally enhances consistency, the rule of law,
and accountability.23 8 However, the litigation challenging DACA
and DAPA has largely eschewed this constitutional concern, fo-
cusing instead on the interpretation of the APA so as to require a
formal rulemaking process in order to bind frontline enforcers to
exercise discretion in a particular way. The APA need not be in-
terpreted this way, as such an interpretation makes it more diffi-
cult for superior political officials to direct the activity of execu-
tive agencies.
D. The Trouble with Civil Servant Deliberation
The presidential control model argues that agency discretion
should be controlled through elected officials, who in turn are ac-
countable to voters.239 This approach explicitly embraces the po-
tential, and even the desirability, for raw political calculations
and/or political ideologies to shape agency policy making. As a re-
sult, some writers refer to this approach as "the political control
model."240 Even critics acknowledge that this has become the dom-
inant model in administrative law,241 although as discussed in
Part III.C, there are actually different views among its propo-
nents about how far presidential control extends in relation to
congressional prerogatives to constrain executive discretion.
236. Id. at 405-06.
237. Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at 184-85,
208.
238. See id. 175-76.
239. See id. 167-70.
240. E.g., Mark Seidenfeld, The Role of Politics in a Deliberative Model of the Adminis-
trative State, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1397, 1400 (2013) [hereinafter Seidenfeld, Role of Pol-
itics].
241. See, e.g., id. at 1400 n.15.
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There is by no means a consensus in favor of presidential con-
trol, and the D.C. Circuit's inconsistent jurisprudence on the ne-
cessity (or lack thereof) for notice-and-comment processes reflects
this ambivalence. In some cases, these divisions relate to differing
policy preferences; a person who disagrees with the President on
policy may be more resistant to giving the President more control.
The Texas litigation against DACA and DAPA could certainly be
explained this way.242 But there are also serious critiques of pres-
idential control, as well as alternative models.' For example, in a
recent essay Professor Mark Seidenfeld critiques Elena Kagan's
political accountability theory, arguing that voters will typically
be unaware of regulatory issues, and even if they are aware, it is
difficult for voters to express their myriad policy preferences
through the election of a single office holder.2" Professor David S.
Rubenstein sounds a note of caution about administrative power
and the growth of agency control over public policy, arguing that
there is a greater need to establish checks and controls on that
245power.
In order to create a check on presidential control, critics argue
for more deliberative policy making at the agency level, especially
through notice-and-comment rulemaking.2 46 For instance, Sei-
denfeld argues that this process "empower[s] stakeholders or the
public directly to provide necessary input into agency rulemaking
in such a way that the agency will act in accordance with the val-
ues held by the policy as a whole."247 It also tends to involve agen-
cy experts with differing knowledge sets, creating the potential
for a better informed policy-making process. 248 However, propo-
nents of deliberative administration differ on the degree to which
they see agency staffs as a direct check on presidential power. For
example, Seidenfeld argues that deliberative policy making is
242. See Cox & Rodriguez, President and Immigration Law Redux, supra note 4, at 114
n.17.
243. See generally David S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal Control of
Administrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2186-213 (2010) (describing the judi-
cial control, presidential control, and congressional control models).
244. Seidenfeld, Role of Politics, supra note 240, at 1416-18.
245. Rubenstein, supra note 243, at 2173, 2179-80.
246. See, e.g., Seidenfeld, Role of Politics, supra note 240, at 1426.
247. Id. at 1429.
248. Id. at 1427-28.
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useful in engaging more stakeholders and focusing policy alterna-
tives, but acknowledges that policy choices ultimately involve
value judgments that should be made by the President, who can
claim the legitimacy that flows from his election mandate.249 By
contrast, other writers argue that internal fragmentation within
the Executive Branch offers a form of separation of powers analo-
gous to constitutional separation of powers between the three
branches of government.2 50 In a recent provocative study, Profes-
sor Jon D. Michaels describes a self-regulating system of adminis-
trative rivals in which agency fragmentation operates as a self-
check on executive power.251
This article argues that alternative models of deliberative or
fragmented administration are often quite useful, but are not es-
pecially well-suited to the immigration context. It is interesting to
observe or describe the potential for fragmented parts of the Ex-
ecutive Branch to act as rivals to each other; indeed, it has been a
primary purpose of this article to describe how such internal ri-
valry has had an impact on immigration policy.252 But, unlike
Congress and the President, agency civil servants are not elect-
ed.253 Empowering agency staffs as a check on the power of elected
officials ultimately disempowers voters in a way that empowering
Congress to check the power of the President does not. In his
study of agency fragmentation, Michaels describes the potential
for civil servants to form alliances with groups outside govern-
ment "to better resist the powerful agency heads (backed by the
President).""' This is an apt description of exactly how frontline
immigration enforcement officers have allied with external oppo-
nents of President Obama's immigration policies to block DACA
and DAPA. Even though he is generally sympathetic to the vir-
tues of agency fragmentation, Michaels acknowledges that such
resistance can go too far, ultimately threatening the integrity of
249. Id. at 1443-44.
250. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal
and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 426-29 (2009); Jon D. Michaels, Of
Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separa-
tion of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3).
251. Michaels, supra note 250, (manuscript at 2-3).
252. See discussion supra Part 1I; see also Cu6llar, supra note 29 (discussing agency
involvement in failing immigration policies).
253. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. amends. XII, XVII.
254. Michaels, supra note 250, (manuscript at 33).
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the separation of powers system established by the Constitu-
255tion.
There should be no need to adopt a single model applicable to
all administrative contexts. It should be possible to adopt an op-
timal mechanism for administrative control tailored to the dy-
namics of specific policy contexts. 2 56 The deliberative model has
particular appeal when Congress prescribes that a particular pol-
icy question should be set according to scientific data with mini-
mal or no room for political or ideological judgment calls.m For
instance, a court intervened to prevent political interference with
agency decision making regarding over-the-counter sale of the
Plan B contraceptive pill. 58 In that case, the statute provided that
drugs should be approved if they are effective and safe, based on
scientific tests. 2 5 9 Also, there is good reason to demand more
transparent deliberation when an agency issues policies in a par-
260ticularly opaque manner that is difficult for the public to access.
When policy is highly technical and not very visible, there is good
reason to doubt the real efficacy of political accountability
through the election of the President.2 61 Deliberative models are
better suited to this context.
Deliberative models of agency decision making are not well
suited to immigration enforcement, however. Unlike FDA ap-
proval of a drug, discretion in immigration enforcement is driven
by "immediate human concerns."26 2 There is little or no reason to
think that ICE agents have any special expertise about these
255. See id.
256. Rubenstein, supra note 243, at 2219-20 (arguing for a "tailored" approach); see
also Jill E. Family, Easing the Guidance Document Dilemma Agency by Agency: Immigra-
tion Law and Not Really Binding Rules, 47 MICH. J. L. REFORM 1, 27 (2013) [hereinafter
Family, Easing] (arguing for an agency-by-agency approach).
257. See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 250, at 423 (noting concerns about politicization of
decisions by the EPA or the Food and Drug Administration).
258. Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
259. Id. at 524; 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2012).
260. See, e.g., Family, Easing, supra note 256, at 9-20 (summarizing historical prob-
lems with the creation of USCIS guidance policies).
261. See Rubenstein, supra note 243, at 2203 (noting that much '"presidential' influ-
ence is actually performed by politically unaccountable surrogates.. ."). However, one
might counter that even when the voting public is not highly engaged in the technical de-
tails of a policy, presidential candidates do often articulate a general approach to regulato-
ry policy which may attract or repel voters even if the details will be implemented by sur-
rogates out of public view.
262. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
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matters. Moreover, Schlanger's insights about how agency staff
tend to focus on their perceived core mission suggests that it ac-
tually may be difficult for frontline officers to balance their en-
forcement orientation against any competing concerns.263 It is one
thing to require a bottom-up deliberative process when lower lev-
el staff have specific expertise that would otherwise be ignored, or
when Congress wanted to insulate policy making from political
considerations. But in the case of immigration enforcement, it is
harder to make the argument that there is any objective expertise
that would be added to the process, and subjective political judg-
ments appear to be exactly what is required.
In taking a tailored approach to administrative governance, it
is also relevant to consider the transparency of presidential acts.
The Supreme Court has not said much about the difference be-
tween legislative and nonlegislative rules, but it has spoken in
favor of measures that "advise the public."264 This makes sense in
terms of political control models of administrative law. The theo-
ry that presidential control establishes electoral accountability
depends on the assumption that the public knows how the Presi-
dent is using this power. From this perspective, DACA and DAPA
should be more defensible because the President announced and
promoted them so publicly. The details of these programs have
been published by the agency and there has already been a vigor-
ous public debate. In this context, it is more difficult to articulate
what a notice-and-comment process would add.
In Elena Kagan's article promoting presidential control over
agency policy making, she noted that the kind of political ac-
countability she advocated could only function if the President's
policies are disclosed to the public.265 This political accountability
cannot work if it is difficult for agency heads to direct field agents
how to exercise discretion. This argument has been developed re-
cently by Professor Catherine Y. Kim, who argues for a functional
approach to political accountability, rather than formalistic in-
263. See discussion supra Part III.
264. See discussion of Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n and Lincoln v. Vigil, supra Part
III.
265. Kagan, Presidential Administration, supra note 225, at 2369 ("The President's in-
volvement, at least if publicly disclosed, vests the action with an increased dose of ac-
countability, which although not (by definition) peculiarly legislative in nature, renders
the action less troublesome than solely bureaucratic measures from the standpoint of
democratic values.").
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sistence on a rigid notice-and-comment process for every situa-
tion. She notes that this argument is especially salient with re
gard to enforcement discretion:
Highly visible policy decisions announced by high-level administra-
tive officials directing categorical grants of relief, even when issued
through informal policy statements, may well be more attentive to
states' interests, subject to greater political accountability, and more
carefully and extensively deliberated than granular case-by-case de-
cisions rendered by street-level officials.26
In the field of immigration enforcement, the APA should not be
interpreted in a manner that would make it difficult for the Pres-
ident, or the head of an agency, to categorically constrain his or
her officers in the field, especially if it is done through a trans-
parent, public statement of policy. In fact, such actions should be
encouraged because they help fulfill central goals of administra-
tive law. They encourage agencies to be more public about how
they use their power, and they locate discretionary authority in
an agency head and, ultimately, the President. This facilitates po-
litical accountability and gives voters a viable role in influencing
how executive discretion will be used. By contrast, the Appala-
chian Power approach would empower anonymous public employ-
ees who exercise discretion largely out of public view and in a
manner that is difficult for voters to change.
To bolster this point, Part IV draws analogies to two other are-
as of law where either scholars or the Supreme Court saw reason
to worry about the power of low-level public employees over pub-
lic policy. One of these concerns a longstanding critique on the in-
fluence of public sector unions over public policy. Another con-
cerns free speech law, where the Court has limited free speech by
dissenting public employees in the workplace context.
266. See Kim, supra note 50, at 726 ('[Plrocedural formality serves as a poor proxy for
determining the extent to which a given decision considered state interests, is subject to
political accountability, or was carefully deliberated.").
267. Id. at 729.
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IV. PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYEE INFLUENCE OVER
PUBLIC POLICY: ANALOGIES
A. Overview
So far, this article has argued that the concept of a rule being
binding, and thus subject to notice and comment under section
553 of the APA, may be understood in two different ways. Under
the view most favorable to the President, a rule is subject to no-
tice and comment only if it is binding on the agency as a whole.
Thus, the head of an agency may issue strict, categorical policies
about how the agency should exercise discretion without going
through notice and comment. But, under the view that has been
adopted by the lower courts in the initial stages of the Texas liti-
gation against DACA and DAPA, a rule is subject to notice and
comment if the head of an agency issues directives that constrain
the discretion available to his or her subordinate officers in the
field. 268 This latter approach is problematic because it gives une-
lected public employees considerable ability to influence public
policy, while making it more difficult for elected leaders to change
how the government behaves at the frontline. This interpretive
problem should lead a court to wrestle with the place of public
employees in setting public policy.
Public employees are, on the one hand, part of a government
apparatus in which policy should be set according to the rules of
constitutional democracy. On the other hand, they are citizens
who have the right to dissent and who may not agree with the
public policy choices made by their superiors. The need to balance
these roles is not new. One analogous area of law in which atten-
tion has been paid to the potential for public employees to thwart
the policy goals of elected officials concerns collective bargaining.
As we have seen in Part II, the unions representing ICE and
USCIS agents have played a pivotal role in the legal challenges to
President Obama's executive actions on immigration. They re-
sisted training under the Morton Memos, filed lawsuits against
DACA and DAPA, and supplied the critical affidavits on which
268. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591, 665-66 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
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Judge Hanen relied to conclude that DACA and DAPA were bind-
ing on frontline officers and thus supposedly subject to section
553 of the APA. 269
Even before the Texas case reached Judge Hanen's courtroom,
frontline resistance played a pivotal role in shaping how the Ad-
ministration designed its deferred action programs. As discussed,
the post-2012 Obama immigration actions were designed strate-
gically to bind frontline immigration officers to force them to fol-
low the President's views on how discretion should be used rather
than their own. 270 By holding that the Administration had to first
go through a notice-and-comment process," the Texas litigation
effectively imposed a significant check on the President's ability
to direct his own administration and, in the process, empowered
public employees at the expense of elected leaders who are their
nominal superiors.
The frontline resistance to the Obama immigration policies has
been highlighted by some writers as an example of civil servant
resistance.2 72 It has been argued that civil servant resistance "may
represent one tool for ensuring executive compliance with the
rule of law."273 In some ways, this argument is similar to the de-
liberative model of administrative rulemaking, in that it places a
high premium on civil servant involvement in policy making as a
check on political influence. But rulemaking engages civil serv-
ants through a process defined by statute with steps and an even-
tual endgame. There is also the potential for civil servants to re-
sist executive policies outside of any internal administrative
procedure, for instance by publicly speaking out, lobbying against
policy goals, or suing to avoid having to enforce a policy with
which they disagree.2 74 Alex Hemmer recently argued that such
resistance fills a useful role, since the civil servants can give voice
to dissenting legal objections that may otherwise never get a
hearing.7
269. Id. at 669-70; Crane v. Napolitano, 920 F. Supp. 2d 724, 730 (N.D. Tex. 2013);
Preston, Agents' Union, supra note 114.
270. See generally discussion supra at Part III.A.
271. See Texas v. United States, 787 F.3d 733, 765-66 (5th Cir. 2015).
272. See, e.g., Alex Hemmer, Civil Servant Suits, 124 YALE L.J. 758, 773-77 (2014).
273. Id. at 762.
274. Id. at 760.
275. Id. at 762, 768-72.
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Part III.D argued that the call for a robust role for civil serv-
ants in deliberative policy making is more compelling when Con-
gress has made clear that decisions should be made according to
technical criteria and not according to political considerations or
if high level officials would otherwise be inclined to act secretly.
This is not the case, however, with immigration enforcement dis-
cretion in the Obama Administration, which inherently involves
subjective value judgments and is a subject on which the voting
public is highly engaged. Moreover, in immigration enforcement
there is little reason to think that frontline officers and civil serv-
ants possess particular expertise. Rather, they appear to simply
embody a competing set of subjective values that may be at odds
with those of the President.
This section turns to two analogies to illustrate why it can be
problematic to give civil servants a privileged role in policy mak-
ing, especially if this means allowing subordinate employees to
thwart the policy goals and value judgments of superior elected
officials simply because they disagree with them. Part B explores
the analogy to public sector unions and the collective bargaining
process, which conservative scholars have criticized for establish-
ing an extra-constitutional constraint on policy making. Part C
focuses on First Amendment cases in which the Supreme Court
and lower courts have drawn a distinction between public em-
ployees participating in public debate in their capacity as private
citizens and when they do so from their privileged position as
government officials. In the immigration context, there should be
space for frontline enforcers to have their opinions heard by the
public and by Congress, even if their views differ from those of
the President. But it would be far more problematic to allow
them, in their official capacities, to resist or disobey policy estab-
lished by their superiors.
B. The Critique of Public Sector Unions
That a conservative coalition would act to strengthen the hand
of public sector employees vis-A-vis the President is rich in iro-
ny.27 During his first term in office, President Reagan engaged in
276. See Linda Greenhouse, Judicial Energy and the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/opinion/judicial-energy-and-the-supreme-
court.html? r=O (comparing conservative arguments for a strong executive during Repub-
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a controversial effort to re-direct (to use a deliberately neutral
term) the enforcement efforts of the EPA.277 Reagan's defenders
could point to the fact that he had campaigned against govern-
ment regulations, including environmental regulations, in 1980
and that, upon being elected, he had a democratic mandate to
change how the agency operated by scaling back, targeting, or
prioritizing enforcement efforts.278 In a sense, this presented an
analogous situation to President Obama's battle with ICE em-
ployees. As discussed in Part II.A, one may make the assumption
that employees of a government agency are generally devoted to
the core mission of their agency. Thus, one should anticipate that
if a President and his political appointees tell the EPA staff to not
aggressively pursue polluters, the EPA staff may be inclined to
resist, much as ICE officers have resisted Obama Administration
directives not to aggressively pursue all unlawfully present im-
migrants. A defender of President Reagan might say that, in a
democracy, questions about how executive discretion should be
exercised should be left to the voters, which means that elected
officials must be able to give direction to unelected public employ-
ees.
The insight that elected officials may face resistance from une-
lected agency employees connects closely to a longstanding cri-
tique about the influence of public sector unions on public policy.
This critique was articulated in legal literature in the early
1970s.2 7 9 The central concern of the early writers on this topic was
the collective bargaining process, which they perceived as raising
different concerns in the public sector than with private compa-
nies and, as a result, called for different regulations.2 80 The sub-
ject of collective bargaining for a public sector union invariably
involves questions of public policy that constitutionally should be
lican administrations to critiques of the same during the Obama Administration).
277. See Philip Shabecoff, Reagan and Environment: To Many, a Stalemate, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 2, 1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/02/us/reagan-and-environment-to-many-a-
stalemate.html?pagewanted=all.
278. See William A. Niskanen, The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Reaganomics,
LIB. OF ECON. & LIBERTY (Oct. 4, 2015), http://www.econlib.org/library/Encl/Reaganomics.
html.
279. See HARRY H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K. WINTER, JR., THE UNIONS AND THE CITIES
2 (1971); Clyde W. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83
YALE L.J. 1156, 1158 (1974).
280. See Lee C. Shaw & R. Theodore Clark, Jr., The Practical Differences Between Pub-
lic and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19 UCLA L. REV. 867, 868 (1972).
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determined by elected officials. Unlike other citizens, public sec-
tor unions have two routes by which they may achieve their pub-
lic policy goals, one through the legislative process and the other
through collective bargaining.28 ' As Clyde Summers wrote in
1974, "[t]he introduction of collective bargaining in the private
sector restructures the labor market, while in the public sector it
also restructures the political process."282
A particularly pointed critique here is that collective bargain-
ing agreements can effectively constrain the legislative process.
An obvious example is the budget process. Collective bargaining
can give public employees a degree of influence over public budg-
ets that other citizens do not enjoy. A labor contract may bind a
government body to certain allocations for wages and benefits
and the obligation to collectively bargain in good faith obligates
public officials to give the union access to a process by which the
government may be influenced and from which other citizens are
simply excluded.28 3 Summers pointed out that, once a collective
bargaining agreement is finalized, its terms may be harder to un-
do than some legislation and regulations.284 While a legislature or
agency could normally undo a statute or a regulation as easily as
it was enacted in the first place, anything covered by a binding
labor agreement might require the consent of the union to
amend."' As a result, whenever mandatory bargaining applies to
a question of public policy, the need to negotiate with the union
arguably imposes an extra-constitutional step in the policy-
making process.8
The early scholarly critique of public sector collective bargain-
ing was quite nuanced.287 Until the 1960s, the predominant view
281. See id. at 872.
282. Summers, supra note 279, at 1156.
283. See id. at 1164.
284. Id. at 1165.
285. Id.
286. For example, the teachers unions have argued that school districts may not estab-
lish new teacher evaluation policies without first negotiating them through collective bar-
gaining. See, e.g., Barbara Jones, Did LAUSD Violate Teachers Union Contract? UTLA
Files Complaint, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2013, 2:35 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.
com/2013/08/23/lausd-violate-teachers-union-n_3804627.html.
287. Cf. Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democ-
racy? A Perspective From the United States, 36 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 277, 279-81, 289-
91 (distinguishing the "traditional attack" on public sector unions from "the new attack"
that has been prominent in Wisconsin and other states since 2011, and noting that the
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was that collective bargaining was inappropriate in the public
sector.2.. In 1962, President Kennedy issued an executive order
initiating collective bargaining in the federal government, herald-
ing a wave of public sector unionization at all levels of govern-
ment.2 89 The academic scrutiny of public sector unions in the
1970s was intended as a corrective to this wave, but did not aim
to entirely reverse it. As Summers articulated it, the main point
was that collective bargaining in the public sector "constitutes
something of a derogation from traditional democratic principles"
and as a result should be limited and subject to careful balancing
tests. 2 9 0 However, Summers argued that public sector bargaining
could be justified where the interests of public employees were di-
rectly opposed to the interests of taxpayers, which is the case
whenever the budget and compensation are at issue.2 9 ' In other
words, early critics of public sector unions did not object to collec-
tive bargaining over wages, benefits, and working hours. Instead,
they argued that collective bargaining becomes more problematic
if it begins to cover other matters of public policy. The difficulties
in drawing this line have long animated legal disputes about
whether particular policies and decisions are subject to mandato-
ry collective bargaining.29 2
In recent years, controversy about public sector unions has
surged, fed by conservative governors and state legislatures that
have promoted legislation to limit or eliminate them.2 3 Wisconsin
Governor Scott Walker led the most prominent of these efforts,
generating massive protests but nonetheless succeeding in elimi-
nating collective bargaining for most state employees.294 A prima-
ry argument for these measures has been the longstanding cri-
tique that public sector unions distort democracy. Governor
Walker, for instance, argued that collective bargaining agree-
early critics did not call for a total elimination of public sector collective bargaining).
288. Cf. Deborah Prokopf, Public Employees at the School of Hard Knox: How the Su-
preme Court is Turning Public-Sector Unions into a History Lesson, 39 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1363, 1366-68 (2013) (summarizing the history of public sector unionization).
289. See id. Malin, supra note 287, at 279; Propkoph, supra note 288, at 1366.
290. Summers, supra note 279, at 1192-93.
291. See id. at 1180-81, 1193.
292. See, e.g., Eric C. Scheiner, Taking the Public out of Determining Government Poli-
cy: The Need for an Appropriate Scope of Bargaining Test in the Illinois Public Sector, 29
J. MARSHALL L. REV. 531, 531 (1996).
293. See Malin, supra note 287, at 277.
294. See id. at 277; Prokopf, supra note 288, at 1364.
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ments constrained local and state legislatures' flexibility to make
sensible choices when they needed to cut their budgets.2 95 At least
for recent conservative critics, these longstanding concerns have
been augmented by new attacks on state administration of union
dues, which critics view as fueling political activities that mainly
benefit the Democratic Party at the expense of Republicans." As
a result, the controversy about public sector unions has a highly
partisan cast. But it is also worth noting that the partisan nature
of anti-union ideology can shift in specific cases if a public sector
union is seen as taking a position that is more right-wing. A re-
cent example may be criticism of police unions in the context of
protests regarding police violence against people of color."' Police
unions have often been seen as more supportive of the political
right, reversing the usual politics associated with public sector
unions."'
It is not the purpose of this article to parse these controversies
comprehensibly, nor to summarize the legislative and judicial de-
bates about limitations on public sector collective bargaining."
Collective bargaining has not been a central problem for Presi-
dent Obama's immigration policies. Nor have wages and benefits.
But critiques of public sector unions show that it can exert special
influence on policy matters and thus must be understood as an
extra-constitutional part of the governmental process.o Summers
295. Scott Walker, Why I'm Fighting in Wisconsin, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2011, 12:01
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487041322045761 9 02 6 0 7 8 7 8 0 5 9 8 4 .
296. See Malin, supra note 287, at 289-305.
297. See, e.g., Steven Rosenfeld, The Real Reason Police Unions Enable the Worst Cop
Abuses, ALTERNET (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www.alternet.org/civil-liberties/real-reason-police-
unions-enable-worst-cop-abuses.
298. See Ross Douthat, Our Police Union Problem, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2015), http://
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/03/opinion/sunday/ross-douthat-our-police-union-problem.html
?_r='0 ("[T]hanks to a mix of cultural affinity, conservative support for law-and-order poli-
cies and police union support for Republican politicians, there hasn't been a strong right-
of-center constituency for taking on their privileges.... In an irony typical of politics,
then, the right's intellectual critique of public-sector unions is illustrated by the ease with
which police unions have bridled and ridden actual right-wing politicians.. .. There are
many similarities between police officers and teachers: Both belong to professions filled
with heroic and dedicated public servants, and both enjoy deep reservoirs of public sympa-
thy as a result. But in both professions, unions have consistently exploited that sympathy
to protect failed policies and incompetent personnel.").
299. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611,
1684-94 (1984) (discussing judicial decisions, as of 1984, regarding the scope of public sec-
tor collective bargaining).
300. See Summers, supra note 279, at 1157 (arguing that public sector bargaining
"must be examined as a part of the governmental process").
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cautioned that there is greater reason for concern about public
sector unions when matters other than compensation become the
target of collective bargaining because the inclusion of any sub-
ject in a labor contract "may preempt the exercise of any mean-
ingful political restraints" by preventing voters and their repre-
sentatives from setting policy in the normal legislative process.aox
Collective bargaining is only one way in which public employ-
ees may be able to resist efforts by elected executives and legisla-
tures to set policy. This is clear in the immigration context where
unions have utilized a variety of other strategies to achieve their
policy goals. The broader lesson is that the potential for public
sector employees to assert influence over public policy is inherent-
ly anti-democratic if it means that public employees have more
capacity to influence policy than other citizens. Since government
is a human institution, it is probably impossible and unnecessary
to completely eliminate this influence. But it is important to
make sure that it remains in check.
The simplest way to ensure that public employees do not influ-
ence government policy in an extra-constitutional manner is to
make sure that public employees remain subordinate to their
elected superiors. Since government policy is set by elected lead-
ers, the public ought to be wary of any effort to establish a pro-
cess that makes it more difficult for elected officials to direct the
work of unelected public employees. Requiring an arduous notice-
and-comment process would do exactly that, especially when
there is no statutory basis for insulating a regulatory decision
from political influence. Thus, if one assumes that granting de-
ferred action is within the discretionary authority of an agency,
one should be wary of an effort to impose notice-and-comment re-
quirements if elected officials want to provide subordinate agency
employees binding direction regarding the exercise of that discre-
tion. To interpret the APA so as to impose such a requirement
has a worrisome anti-democratic impact.
301. Id. at 1181. As an illustration, Summers argued that there is a difference between
a teachers union negotiating for higher salaries than negotiating for greater control of the
curriculum. Id. at 1181-82.
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C. The Free Speech Challenge
Another area of law that highlights the complicated role of pub-
lic employees in setting public policy is free speech cases in which
public employees express criticisms of the agencies they work for
or of the policies set by their superiors. First Amendment law
recognizes that public sector employees occupy an ambiguous po-
sition because they are simultaneously citizens with rights to pe-
tition their government and to speak about matters of public con-
cern, while also serving as employees of the government-or,
more precisely, an unelected part of the government. This ambi-
guity can be seen vividly in the case of immigration enforcement
agents.
As discussed in Part II.A, the unions representing immigration
enforcement officers-most importantly, the National ICE Coun-
cil-have publicly advocated positions adverse to the Obama Ad-
ministration's positions on immigration. For example, in 2010,
the union issued a "vote of no confidence" in John Morton, the Di-
rector of ICE, expressing "growing dissatisfaction and concern
among ICE employees ... that [ICE leaders] have abandoned the
Agency's core mission of enforcing United States Immigration
laws and providing for public safety, and have instead directed
their attention to campaigning for programs and policies related
to amnesty .... ,,2
In 2013, the union's president wrote a public letter to the
White House noting his recent testimony to the House of Repre-
sentatives and the union's lawsuit against the DHS, complaining
that "our officers effectively have to choose between enforcing the
law as we're trained or losing their jobs."' Three months later,
the National ICE Council sent a letter to Congress co-signed by
thirty-one local law enforcement officers expressing opposition to
the comprehensive immigration reform bill, S. 744, which was
one of President Obama's high legislative priorities.3 04 The Na-
302. Press Release, Nat'l Council 118-Immigration and Customs Enf., Vote of No Con-
fidence in ICE Dir. John Morton and ICE ODPP Assistant Dir. Phyllis Coven (June 25,
2010), http://iceunion.org/download/259-259-vote-no-confidence.pdf.
303. Letter from Chris Crane, President, Nat'l ICE Council, to the President of the
United States (Feb. 12, 2013), http://iceunion.org/download/2615-council-itr-white-house-
02-13-2013.pdf.
304. Letter from Chris Crane, President, Nat'l ICE Council, et al., to Members of Con-
gress (May 9, 2013), http://iceunion.org/downloadl2738-letter-lawmakers-05-09-13- L.pdf.
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tional ICE Council has also publicly feuded with the American
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, its
parent organization, which has been more supportive of compre-
hensive immigration reform."' Such public advocacy raises the
question: can public employees be opponents of government policy
while also being responsible for implementing that policy?
When public employees express themselves publicly on matters
of public policy, a great deal depends on whether they are doing
so in a purely private capacity. In Rutan v. Republican Party of
Illinois, the Supreme Court held that a state may not condition
public employment hiring decisions on a person's private political
beliefs."o' But in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court found that public
employees can be fired for things they say as part of their job re-
sponsibilities."o' This line between private opinions and work-
related expression has never been easy to draw, especially since
public employees are likely to be most interested in the areas of
public policy with which they work, and their views are likely to
contribute significantly to public debate on those topics.
The Supreme Court highlighted the need to strike a delicate
balance with its 1968 decision in Pickering v. Board of Education,
which involved a public school teacher who was dismissed after
writing a letter to a newspaper criticizing the board of education
and the district superintendent for their handling of school dis-
trict tax revenue."' The Court observed that government employ-
ees, like any citizens, have the right to participate in public de-
bate about matters of public concern."o' But when a government
employee criticizes the operation of a government agency, he or
she is also criticizing her own employer. This poses a constitu-
tional challenge, since government agencies must be able to effec-
tively manage their operations like any other employer, and em-
ployers naturally have concerns when their employees become
public critics. Justice Marshall, writing for the Pickering Court
305. Press Release, Nat'l ICE Council, ICE Agents Union President Defends Lawmak-
ers from AFL-CIO Threats, Encourages Rubio to Leave Gang of 8 (Apr. 12, 2013), http://
iceunion.org/download/2692-ice-council-release-04-12-13-2.pdf.
306. 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990) ("[P]romotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on
[private] political affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First
Amendment rights of public employees.").
307. 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
308. 391 U.S. 563, 564-65 (1968).
309. Id. at 572.
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explained, "[t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance be-
tween the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as
an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.""o
A critical, distinguishing fact in Pickering is that there was no
evidence the letter to the editor impeded Mr. Pickering's duties as
a teacher.' 1 Moreover, it is difficult to imagine any kind of ex-
pression that is more at the core of the First Amendment than
writing a letter to the editor of a local newspaper about school
taxes. The Court held that, "[i]n these circumstances we conclude
that the interest of the school administration in limiting teachers'
opportunities to contribute to public debate is not significantly
greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public.""'
Pickering was thus an easy case, with only one Justice in par-
tial dissent."' By finding that Mr. Pickering had the same right
as any other citizen to express his opinion in the newspaper in a
private capacity," 4 the Court set down an important marker that
makes clear that government's authority as an employer cannot
completely swallow its employees' freedom of speech.
Pickering recognizes that there is a balance to be struck, but it
proved to be less than clear in establishing an analytical ap-
proach that would be able to resolve more difficult situations. The
Court has struggled ever since to define how the line should be
drawn. Was Mr. Pickering's speech protected because of its con-
tent, since he spoke about a matter of public concern? Was it pro-
tected because he spoke in a public forum? Was it protected be-
cause the school made no showing that it had a detrimental effect
at work? The Court has wavered between focusing on close exam-
310. Id. at 568.
311. See id. at 572-73 ("What we do have before us is a case in which a teacher has
made erroneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of public atten-
tion, which are critical of his ultimate employer but which are neither shown nor can be
presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher's proper performance of his daily
duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of the schools gen-
erally.").
312. Id. at 573.
313. Justice White argued that the teacher's statements should not be protected if they
are demonstrably false. See id. at 583-84 (White, J., dissenting).
314. See id. at 573-74.
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ination of the content of the speech to focusing more on the con-
text in which the speech occurs.
A context-based approach is more sound doctrinally because it
is less likely to produce discrimination based on the identity of
the speaker. For present purposes, the tension between a content-
based or a context-based approach to public employee speech is
useful for understanding the role that ICE agents have played in
resisting President Obama's policies. If the First Amendment at-
taches when public employees express themselves on matters of
public concern (the content-based approach), then there is a
strong argument for defending the prerogative of civil servants to
use their position in the government to resist policies with which
they disagree. But if context matters more-which is the ap-
proach taken by more recent case law-then public employees
should not have much latitude to act on their personal opinions
while carrying out their official duties. From this point of view,
they should be free to express themselves in contexts where they
can speak as private citizens. When they are at work, however,
they may literally have to do as they are told.
The Court has handled two more public school teacher speech
cases and resolved both in favor of the employees' speech. In
Madison Joint School District No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Re-
lations Commission, the Court found that a teacher was constitu-
tionally permitted as a citizen to criticize collective bargaining
negotiations during a public school board meeting."' This is per-
haps unsurprising because it involved public comment in a public
meeting about a matter of public concern and thus implicated a
core type of speech protected by the First Amendment.316 Perhaps
more interesting, the Court also ruled for the teacher in Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School District, when the teacher
was fired for criticizing the lack of racial diversity among school
staff.' A key fact here was that the teacher expressed her criti-
cisms privately to her superior, and so the decision cannot be ex-
plained by the public nature of the forum."' As a result, a reason-
able conclusion from these early cases is that content matters
most in deciding whether public employee speech is protected by
315. See 429 U.S. 167, 175-77 (1976).
316. See id. at 174-76.
317. See 439 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1979).
318. See id. at 412, 415.
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the First Amendment. The teacher in Givhan spoke out only pri-
vately and at work, but the substantive issue that she spoke
about-racial discrimination in school employment-is just as
ripe for public debate as taxes or collective bargaining."'
This content-focused approach appeared to be confirmed when
the Court set down another marker in the opposite direction in
Connick v. Myers. Sheila Myers, an Assistant District Attorney,
was fired after circulating a questionnaire to fifteen of her fellow
Assistant DAs asking their opinions about their supervisors, of-
fice morale, and various office policies. 2 0 A divided 5-4 Court
found this was not protected speech because the expression in
question was not about a matter of public concern but rather "is
most accurately characterized as an employee grievance concern-
ing internal office policy."32 ' In Connick, the Court seemed to focus
especially on the content of the speech at issue to decide whether
it enjoyed First Amendment protection.322 The Connick Court
spent much of its opinion analyzing the questions in the employ-
ee's questionnaire to measure the degree to which it dealt with
matters of public concern versus matters of simple grievance.32
This content-focused approach confronts significant problems,
the most obvious of which is the difficulty in distinguishing public
employee grievances from legitimate subjects for public debate.
Content analysis also has implications for speaker discrimination
because it would seem to imply that public employees cannot
speak freely about certain topics in certain contexts. The Court
recognized that nearly anything that goes on in a government of-
fice could be legitimate fodder for public discussion in theory but
feared that "[tlo presume that all matters which transpire within
a government office are of public concern would mean that virtu-
ally every remark-and certainly every criticism directed at a
public official-would plant the seed of a constitutional case." 24
Still, the Court did not establish a clear rubric by which to draw
319. See id. at 412-13, 415-16.
320. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983).
321. Id. at 154.
322. See id. at 146-52.
323. See id. at 148-52.
324. Id. at 149.
2016]1 727
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
the line, observing that the content, form, and context of speech
are all relevant.
The Court's focus on content in employee speech cases ap-
peared again in the 1994 case of Waters v. Churchill, where the
Court failed to produce a majority opinion.3 26 Two nurses at a pub-
lic hospital had a conversation at work during their break.3 27 One
nurse, Cheryl Churchill, advised her colleague not to transfer to
her department because it was a bad place to work.328 Churchill's
supervisor, Cynthia Waters, heard about Churchill's statements,
and ultimately had her fired.3 29 Before going any further, it should
be obvious from these facts why the Court has feared that even
the most tedious employment issue can become a constitutional
case if the employer happens to be the government. That this fair-
ly mundane workplace speech-the kind of situation normally de-
rided as office politics-managed to split the Supreme Court so
severely is perhaps a good indicator that the Court had failed to
find an effective doctrinal test for employee speech cases.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the plurality, explained why free
speech cannot apply in government workplaces the way it does in
the public square.3 Justice O'Connor stated that, "surely a public
employer may, consistently with the First Amendment, prohibit
its employees from being 'rude to customers,' a standard almost
certainly too vague when applied to the public at large."3 3 1 Never-
theless, four Justices ended up analyzing at considerable length a
conversation between two off-duty nurses who were talking about
whether a particular hospital department was a pleasant place to
work.332 They concluded that the case required a remand for fur-
ther fact finding about Waters' true motivation for firing Church-
ill, thus pulling the Constitution and the federal courts ever
deeper into the internal workings of the McDonough District
Hospital.3
325. Id. at 147-48.
326. See 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion).
327. Id. at 664.
328. Id. at 664-65.
329. Id. at 665-66.
330. See id. at 672-73.
331. Id. at 673.
332. See id. at 679-82.
333. See id. at 681-82.
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In Waters, seven Justices agreed that Churchill's comments to
her fellow nurse were not entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion."' But they failed to agree on the rationale. The plurality fo-
cused first on the content of what Churchill said, that
"[d]iscouraging people from coming to work for a department cer-
tainly qualifies as disruption.""' The plurality also believed that a
public employer needed to establish some procedure to discern
whether specific instances of employee speech enjoyed constitu-
tional protection.' Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas disa-
greed with this procedural requirement."' But they all appeared
to agree that the content of the speech determined the outcome.
Nevertheless, lower courts applying the content-based approach
have been divided, at least to some extent, about how to deter-
mine if public employee speech is a matter of public concern or
not.339
The Supreme Court turned away from the content-focused ap-
proach in Garcetti v. Ceballos.34 0 In this case, Richard Ceballos, a
deputy district attorney in Los Angeles, wrote internal memoran-
da expressing concerns about police conduct in a case.34 1 His su-
pervisors decided to persist in the prosecution and allegedly retal-
iated against Ceballos, who testified for the defense.342 In terms of
substantive content, Ceballos seemed to have a stronger First
Amendment claim than Myers or Churchill, whose dissenting
speech dwelled more on internal employment-related grievances.
Ceballos was fired for expressing an opinion about police miscon-
duct, which would seem to be a public concern that resonates
with the core purposes of the First Amendment.34 3 But the majori-
334. Id. at 663, 681.
335. Id. at 680.
336. Id. at 668-69.
337. Id. at 686 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
338. See id. at 686, 689-90.
339. See Erika Eisenoff, Hear No Evil, See No Evil ... Speak No Evil? A Re-
Examination of Public Employee Free Speech Rights, 9 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 643, 644
(2011); Sarah L. Fabian, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Whether an Employee Speaks as a Citizen or
as a Public Employee-Who Decides?, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1675, 1688 (2010); Thomas
Keenan, Circuit Court Interpretations of Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Development of Pub-
lic Employee Speech, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 841-42 (2011).
340. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
341. Id. at 414.
342. Id. at 414-15.
343. See id. at 432-34 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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ty found that the decisive issue was the context and forum in
which he expressed his opinion, not the subject matter.3 " He was
in a position to offer his views only because of his job as a prose-
cutor, and "[riestricting speech that owes its existence to a public
employee's professional responsibilities does not infringe any lib-
erties the employee might have enjoyed as a private citizen."
Rather than focus on the substance and content of what the
employee said, Garcetti shifts the focus to the context in which
the employee speaks.' This can be an easier test for courts to ap-
ply in the public sector. Consider, for example, a Fifth Circuit
case decided just a few months after Garcetti concerning whether
an employee at a county hospital had a right to wear a "Union
Yes" button, in violation of a uniform non-adornment policy.347 Us-
ing the pre-Garcetti content-focused approach, this could be a dif-
ficult case because pro-union sentiment may touch on both a gen-
eral matter of public concern and more individualized
grievances.' The court worried that if a pro-union button were
permitted, buttons with more divisive political statements would
also be permitted.3 ' Had Garcetti been decided in favor of protect-
ing any speech on any matter of public debate, it would have been
difficult to escape this. But the Fifth Circuit was able to resolve
the case on simpler grounds because the button was being worn
at work and the government employer had a neutral uniform pol-
* 350icy.
There is considerable friction between the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Garcetti and, in particular, Givhan.' One line of
thought is that the Court's cases since Pickering have marked an
erosion of employee speech rights and have effectively rendered
344. Id. at 418, 421.
345. Id. at 421-22 ("The significant point is that the memo was written pursuant to
Ceballos' official duties.").
346. As Lawrence Rosenthal observes, it is the context of the Ceballos memo rather
than its content that distinguishes it from a classic whistleblower case. Lawrence Rosen-
thal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogrative, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 33, 38 (2008).
347. Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Ector Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427, 430 (5th Cir.
2006) (en banc).
348. See id. at 438 (discussing the ways in which the message was ambiguous in terms
of matters of public concern).
349. Id. at 441.
350. See id. at 441-42.
351. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 429-30, 440 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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public employees equivalent to private sector workers. 5 2 This lim-
its public employees from contributing to public debate on mat-
ters about which they have considerable expertise. Others have
argued that it is impractical or unfair to ask civil servants to turn
on and off the citizen or employee aspects of their identity, de-
pending on whether they are at work or at home.' The trouble is
that the Court has repeatedly and recently expressed concern
that the First Amendment should not be an opening for every
government employment dispute to be constitutionalized and ne-
cessitate judicial intervention.' The cases before Garcetti illus-
trate the potential under the content-based approach for the Su-
preme Court to be drawn into fairly pedestrian disputes between
supervisors and subordinates.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit developed a valua-
ble approach that would escape these difficulties. In the wake of
Garcetti, the Second Circuit found the key to determining wheth-
er the First Amendment applies in full is whether the speech is
made as part of an employee's official duties.35 6 If it is not-in oth-
er words, if the speech is made in a private capacity-then it en-
joys far stronger constitutional protection.' To determine wheth-
er an employee is speaking in an official or private capacity, the
Second Circuit asks whether the speech in question has a "civil-
ian analogue."' The idea here is that, if a non-government em-
ployee could engage in a similar form of expression, then it is pri-
vate speech, even if it takes place at work.' This explains
352. See Adam Shinar, Public Employee Speech and the Privatization of the First
Amendment, 46 CONN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2013).
353. See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) ("Teachers are, as a class,
the members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how
funds allocated to the operation of the schools should be spent."); Elizabeth M. Ellis, Gar-
cetti v. Ceballos: Public Employees Left to Decide "Your Conscience or Your Job," 41 IND. L.
REV. 187, 189 (2008); Diane Norcross, Separating the Employee from the Citizen: The So-
cial Science Implications of Garcetti v. Ceballos, 40 U. BALT. L. REV. 543, 548 (2011);
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doc-
trinal Formalism, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1177 (2007).
354. See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government Em-
ployees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2163 (2010).
355. Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2496 (2011); Connick v. Myers,
461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983).
356. See Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010).
357. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 423 (2006).
358. See id. at 424; Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 2011); Weintraub, 593
F.3d at 203-04.
359. See Jackler, 658 F.3d at 241; Caroline A. Flynn, Policeman, Citizen, or Both? A
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Garcetti, because a civilian could never be in a position to write
internal legal memoranda for a District Attorney's office.
The official duties exception to the First Amendment is useful
as an analogy for understanding the proper role for dissent by
public employees, such as the ICE officers. Just as teachers may
speak as private citizens at school board meetings, it makes sense
that ICE officers, privately or through their union may advocate
their views in the press or to Congress. But it is a different mat-
ter if they resist carrying out the directives and policies set by
their superiors when they are at work. In his study of civil serv-
ant suits, Hemmer makes an analogous distinction between "civil
servant disobedience and civil servant disclosure."3 60 He notes that
whistleblower statutes protect civil servants who disclose infor-
mation about law violations to the public.361 However, this excep-
tion does not embrace broader forms of resistance where public
employees simply refuse to carry out policies with which they dis-
agree.362 Empowering public employees to participate in public
debate-including, in extreme cases, by revealing misconduct-is
one thing. Allowing them to directly refuse to carry out govern-
ment policy is quite another.
The potential for public employees to participate vigorously in
public debate is easy to see in the immigration context. Frontline
DHS officers spoke out against President Obama's policy-both
his legislative goals and his executive actions. They also filed suit
in court to stop policies they believed to be illegal and offered crit-
ical evidence in the Texas litigation.' These activities should be
protected under the First Amendment. Moreover, the capacity for
public employees to express themselves provides a means by
which their input can be heard, even when the policy is not set
through a formal deliberative process. It is a different matter
once these public employees decide to implement their opinions
instead of the President's in the course of their official duties.
In the Texas case, the courts have been asked to make it more
difficult for the President to direct frontline enforcers how to ex-
Civilian Analogue Exception to Garcetti v. Ceballos, 111 U. MICH. L. REV. 759, 774-75
(2013).
360. Hemmer, supra note 272, at 789.
361. Id.
362. See id. at 789-90.
363. See supra Part III.C.
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ercise discretion. Put another way, the courts were asked to make
it easier for DHS officers to exercise discretion differently than
the President would want. A President should tolerate dissent,
but need not tolerate disobedience by his own Executive Branch.
Public employees, because of their unique experience and
knowledge, are in a unique position to persuade their fellow citi-
zens and to change policy through the political process. But they
should accomplish this through the power of persuasion and not
by using their position of employment.
CONCLUSION
The position adopted by the Fifth Circuit and by District Judge
Hanen have made it more difficult for the President and his DHS
Secretary to determine how discretion is exercised in immigration
enforcement, by reasoning that DHS must go through notice and
comment to enact a clearly prescribed policy on deferred action.
Essentially, the Fifth Circuit's position is that, as a default, dis-
cretion belongs at the bottom, with the frontline enforcers."' If
the heads of government agencies or the President want to pre-
scribe how discretion should be exercised, they must go through a
cumbersome and time consuming rulemaking procedure.
The APA is regrettably ambiguous about this issue. It requires
notice and comment for legislative rules, but not for non-
legislative rules or "general statements of policy.""' The Supreme
Court has stressed that administrative law aims to make the pub-
lic better informed about how an agency plans to enforce the law.
They appear to have no particular suspicion of policy statements
that do not go through notice and comment but nevertheless ac-
complish the goal of transparency.36 6 But it has fallen on the D.C.
Circuit to put meat on the bones of the distinction between policy
statements and rules. In so doing, the D.C. Circuit has focused on
whether a statement of policy is "binding."3 6 7
Unfortunately, any attempt to discern the doctrinal clarity to
separate binding rules from general statements of policy con-
364. See discussion supra Part III.B.
365. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012).
366. See discussion supra Part III.B.
367. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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fronts three significant problems. First, the concepts probably
represent a continuum on which different statements and policies
are distinguishable only as a matter of degree. Second, the Su-
preme Court has had relatively little to say on the subject. Third,
the D.C. Circuit has articulated a number of different tests to
make this separation, but it has not always been clear about the
purpose of using one test versus another.
The two clearest articulations of a rationale appear in Pacific
Gas and in Appalachian Power. In Pacific Gas, the D.C. Circuit
indicated that statements of policy can be useful to encourage
agencies to be more transparent with the public about how they
exercise their powers.' This view appears fairly consistent with
the Supreme Court's recent statement in Perez that there can be
good reasons to avoid notice and comment, so long as an agency
accepts the trade-offs.'" By contrast, in Appalachian Power the
D.C. Circuit took a far more skeptical approach, suggesting that
any time "a document issued at headquarters is controlling in the
field," notice and comment may be required. "7o Indeed, in the con-
text of the struggle between low-level immigration enforcement
officers and the Obama Administration, many of the President's
immigration actions appear to intentionally tie the hands of sub-
ordinates who might otherwise resist his policies. Requiring a
more formal deliberative process would be justified if the court
has reason to worry that an agency is eluding public transparen-
cy regarding its policies or if there would be no other effective
means by which the public may be heard on the issue. But it is
harder to defend the focus on headquarters controlling the field,
since that is an internal agency management issue and does not
relate directly to the agency's relationship with the public.
The reference to "binding the field" contrasts with the D.C. Cir-
cuit's post-Perez case law, where the court focused on whether a
policy creates "rights and obligations" vis-A-vis the public."' To
reach the conclusion that headquarters must go through notice
368. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 506 F.2d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
discussion supra Part III.B.
369. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1203-04 (2015); discussion
supra Part IH.B.
370. See Appalachian Power v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1021 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
371. See Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA v. Huerta, 785 F.3d 710 (D.C. Cir. 2015); dis-
cussion supra Part III.B.
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and comment in order to bind the field, the court should explain
why one should be alarmed by the head of an agency telling its
field agents what to do. References to headquarters binding the
field in D.C. Circuit case law should be considered stray com-
ments, not to be read strictly, which have in any case been super-
seded by more recent decisions.
The DACA/DAPA litigation could be an opportunity clarify the
legislative/nonlegislative rule distinction. This article offered
analogies to public sector unions and to First Amendment claims
by public employees to illustrate that there are serious problems
with public employees-who are anonymous and largely beyond
the reach of voters-having too much influence over policy. This
article suggests that the questions of transparency and of wheth-
er a policy is binding are indeed relevant, but the central issue in
administrative law is about the relationship between the gov-
ernment and the general public, not about the relationship be-
tween headquarters and a field office within an agency.
It makes sense to require rulemaking when a rule would be
binding on an agency vis-A-vis the public. Likewise, if an admin-
istration tries to change policy in secret, it may be useful for de-
mocracy to force the process into the open through notice and
comment. But DACA and DAPA do not raise these concerns. They
do not create enforceable rights for would-be beneficiaries. The
policies can be changed at a moment's notice by a future admin-
istration or, for that matter, by the current one. Or, the agency
could decide to simply not grant deferred action in a particular
case where the applicant appeared eligible according to the pub-
lished criteria. Moreover, the President has informed the public
about his policies in the highest profile manner possible. As a re-
sult, if the public is displeased by the policies, the public can
change them by electing a different President. In this context, it
is not clear what goals would be achieved by requiring notice and
comment, other than simply delaying the process. More to the
point, our default should be to give discretionary powers to our
elected President, who is accountable to the public, not to anony-
mous public employees.
Weighing the resource constraints and human equities in-
volved in potential deportation requires value judgments, and
there may not be any immediate, objectively correct approach. In
our system of government, it is important that such judgment
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calls be made in a manner that is democratically accountable.
The answer to the ultimate administrative law question-who
decides?-ought to be the voters, who can choose among candi-
dates who might exercise this judgment in different ways. For
this to be possible, the President needs to be able to direct his or
her administration about how to exercise discretion. Ultimately,
the choice is not between having a rule or not having a rule. Nor
is it a choice between exercising discretion in immigration en-
forcement or not doing so. The real choice is between having dis-
cretion exercised by an anonymous frontline officer, or by the
President and a cabinet secretary who set policy in full public
view. Courts should be reluctant to impose constraints on such
discretionary policies, so long as the President is transparent
with the public about them, thus permitting the voters to change
these policies in the next election.
